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ABSTRACT 
In the current global environment, interstate coercion methods are used to compel 
behavior modification amongst state and state-sponsored actors. Traditional compellence 
is commonly considered in its overt, diplomatic manifestation. However, in the age of 
low-intensity conflict where domestic and international exigencies often constrain U.S. 
coercive policy options, covert methods in the form of unconventional warfare, 
subversion, sabotage and other associated paramilitary and political actions are 
occasionally pursued as the means to support the U.S.’s coercive overtures. Under the 
rubric of covert coercion there are state-level decision frames, strategies, and resistance 
force alliance conditions that contribute to either the success or failure of covert coercion 
ventures that utilize unconventional warfare approaches. This analysis utilizes game 
theoretic models, as well as insights from prospect theory, to explain the conditions under 
which unconventional warfare could prove a viable U.S. coercive policy option. 
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“War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” 
—Carl von Clausewitz1  
A. BACKGROUND 
The ideas of coercion and compellence are not new. Ever since man has had the 
ability to organize himself into tribes, cities, nations, and Westphalian state institutions, 
the use of force—or threats of force—has been used to compel an adversary to bend to 
one’s will. It is the very definition of war itself according to the renowned war theorist 
Carl von Clausewitz, and war is said to be as old as antiquity. However, the modern 
manifestation of compellence through coercive diplomacy merits further examination. It 
is widely recognized among Cold War deterrence theorists such as Thomas Schelling that 
World War II and the advent of the atomic bomb drastically changed the ways and means 
of interstate compellence given man’s accelerated and awesome capacity of mass 
destruction.2  As the concept of nuclear deterrence evolved so did the coercive methods 
that the U.S. employed to counter its adversary, the Soviet Union, in the then bi-polar 
interstate system.   
The appetite for mass destruction waned in the aftermath of World War II, but the 
need for compellence was as great as ever for the U.S. in its efforts to counterbalance the 
Soviet Union’s communist influence. As the Cold War matured so did the U.S.’s 
approach. Then U.S. President Harry Truman was confronted with the communist 
expansionist threat posed by both the Soviet Union and Mao Tse-Tung’s grassroots 
communist revolution that was rapidly spreading its influence throughout Southeast Asia. 
By 1948 significant portions of Asia and Eastern Europe were starting to turn red and 
Truman needed a policy to counter the perceived communist threat without provoking a 
nuclear World War III. Truman found such a policy in political scientist George 
                                                
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Prussia: circa 1780–1831, repr. with ed., trans., and preface notes by 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 1989), 75. Kindle 
edition. 
2 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966), 
18–26. 
 2 
Kennan’s “containment” telegraph. Containment sought to prevent the further expansion 
of communism by developing a sphere of democratic influence in strategic states at risk 
to communist expansionism. However, containment was not enough to compel change in 
communist affected areas. The containment policy eventually evolved into a “roll-back” 
policy under President Dwight Eisenhower in an effort to take back states that had 
already turned to communism. Central to both the “containment” and “roll-back” policies 
were the necessitated activities identified within covert action.3   
President Truman institutionalized covert action when he signed the National 
Security Council Directive 10/2 to establish to Office of Special Projects to be managed 
by the Central Intelligence Agency on June 18, 1948. This directive was significant in 
expanding the CIA’s authorities from intelligence collection, analysis, and propaganda to 
direct and forcible intervention in another state’s affairs.4  According to the directive, 
covert action was defined as: 
… propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including 
sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion 
against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance 
movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations groups, and support of 
indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free-
world.5 
Covert action’s inception as an instrument of U.S. compellence policy was novel 
in the U.S.’s adolescent history given the long-standing preference for mass and 
firepower in support of annihilation or attrition warfare strategies in the American 
military tradition.6  Since its establishment, covert action has had a profound effect on the 
way the now hegemonic U.S. views its menu of coercive options. Why has covert action 
sometimes worked magnificently as a form of compellence in certain situations while it 
                                                
3 John Jacob Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy (Amherst, 
New York: Prometheus Books, 2000), 39. 
4 Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 210. 
5 National Security Council Directive 10/2, National Security Council directive on Office of Special 
Projects (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 1948), sec. 5. 
6 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), 17, 141, 317. 
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failed miserably in others?  Is covert action even a viable coercive option in the 
contemporary interstate system?  If so, why would covert action be preferred to 
traditional overt coercive diplomacy?  It was these questions that led me to this project—
an analysis of covert coercion.   
B. THESIS PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the use of unconventional warfare as a 
covert coercive policy option of the U.S.. Specifically, this thesis will attempt to model 
the interrelation of state-level decision frames, strategies, and resistance force alliance 
conditions that contribute to either the success or failure of a covert coercion venture that 
utilizes unconventional warfare approaches.   
The conceptual scope of the thesis will focus on the use of UW as an instrument 
of interstate compellence. Specifically, the scope of the research and analysis will define 
and analyze a descriptive decision theory for understanding the conditions under which a 
UW campaign is both preferred and likely to be effective as a U.S. coercive policy option 
against another state actor. The two principal characteristics in support of this aim are: (1) 
the decision frames of the state actors, and (2) the U.S.’s perceived utility payoff of 
pursuing a covert coercion policy juxtaposed with the utility payoffs associated with the 
coerced state’s ability and willingness to mollify the U.S. and/or insurgency through 
concessions in response to covert coercion. The UW definition that I will utilize within 
this scope is USSOCOM’s active definition derived from the U.S. Army Special Forces 
Unconventional Warfare manual.7 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis intends to answer the following question in an effort to analyze the 
strategic utility and feasibility of covert coercion: What decision frames and political 
                                                
7 U.S. Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, TC 18–01 (General Dennis 
J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library, 2011) accessed March 22, 2012, 
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/tc18_01.pdf. TC18–01 defines unconventional 
warfare as, “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or 
overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and 
guerrilla force in a denied area.”   
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conditions are necessary to establish covert coercion by means of unconventional 
warfare as a viable United States coercive policy option?  This question allows for the 
broadening of U.S. compellence policy options while realistically and responsibly 
accounting for the risk and costs associated with likely UW coercion outcomes.   
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The two hypotheses and corresponding warrant (assumption) identified as critical 
to test in the pursuit of the thesis research question resultant from the literature review 
are: 
Hypothesis 1: The decision frames of the coercion actors largely determine the success 
or failure of covert coercion.  
 
Hypothesis 1.a: Domestic and international political constraints, probabilities of 
outcomes, and perceptions of prestige and legitimacy determine an actor’s 
decision frame.   
 
Hypothesis 1.b: A state actor’s decision frame is determinant in which 
coercion/response strategy the actor pursues. 
 
Hypothesis 1.c: The decision frames of the coercion actors can change through 
time.8 
 
Hypothesis 2: A coerced state must have room to make concessions.9   
  
Hypothesis 2.a: If covert coercion targets a rogue state’s gains (i.e., occupation of 
a third party state), it will be more likely to compel behavior modification, or gain 
concessions. 
 
Hypothesis 2.b: If covert coercion targets a rogue state’s losses (i.e., threatening 
overthrow/regime change), where the rogue state is less able to make concessions, 
compellence will likely not be achieved.  
                                                
8 The idea that decision frames change through time is based upon the Bayesian interpretation of 
Bayes’ theorem. In principle, Bayes’ theorem holds that a decision maker will update probabilities ascribed 
to event outcomes as new information is made known to the decision maker. See Ian Hacking, “Slightly 
More Realistic Personal Probability,” in Decision, Probability, and Utility: Selected Readings, ed. by Peter 
Gardenfors and Nils-Eric Sahlin, 118–35 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 123. 
9 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect theory is the underpinning premise for this 
hypothesis. Prospect theory and its relation to decision frames is discussed at length in Chapter III. See 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” 




Assumption: All covert proxy force actions eventually become known. While the 
secrecy of the sponsor for a covert paramilitary or political action may remain veiled for 
a time, all covert actions using proxy forces become overt, or known, over time.10 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will use Game theoretic analysis to explain the interrelation between 
the two principal actors involved in covert coercion by means of UW: the U.S. and a 
targeted rogue state.11  This logical approach will allow for the advancement in the theory 
of covert coercion as it pertains to the nexus of the actors involved. The strength of 
utilizing game theory as the method for analysis is that game theory allows for 
cognizable, yet relatively simplistic, modeling of total and partial inter-actor conflict 
where the actors are assumed to be rational, however the outcomes of the conflict are 
dependent upon which strategy each actor pursues simultaneously or sequentially. 
Consequently, game theory conflict modeling has traditionally been advantageous in 
examining interstate conflict scenarios dating back to the Cold War era.12  Given that 
covert coercion is an interstate conflict policy option, it is logical to analyze covert 
coercion’s efficacy through the lens of game theory. Admittedly, the primary weakness 
associated with this method is the subjective cardinal value interval scaling used to model 
the decision behavior of the principal actors, which is resultant from the author’s 
subjective assumptions extrapolated from various historical UW case literatures. This 
issue will be addressed by basing each of the game assumptions on grounded theoretical 
and empirical research, thereby lending greater credibility to each game analyzed.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS/CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In Chapter II the idea of covert coercion will be introduced and defined in detail. 
The aim of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the strengths and weaknesses of 
                                                
10 Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops, 167. 
11 For the purposes of this thesis, the proxy resistance force through which the U.S. is able to achieve a 
covert coercive effect will not be analyzed as a principal actor. However, the resistance force’s power to 
undermine the efforts of either the U.S. or the rogue state are not to be understated and should be a 
consideration for future coercion game theory models and research. 
12 Frank C. Zagare, “Game Theory and Security Studies,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, edited 
by Paul D. Williams, 44–58 (London: Routledge, 2008), 46, 53. 
 6 
covert coercion vis-à-vis traditional overt coercive diplomacy to establish contrast 
between the two coercive strategies for game theory analysis. Chapter III will introduce 
Decision, Prospect, and Game theories, which are the foundational theories for the 
models of coercion conflict that this thesis is predicated upon. Additionally, game theory 
modeling will be introduced and discussed in the context of coercion conflict. Coercion 
game assumptions and a game model will be constructed, analyzed and outcomes 
explained in Chapter IV. The model’s outcomes will be compared to select historical 
overt and covert coercion cases to substantiate the findings.   
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II. COVERT COERCION: A VIABLE EXTENSION OF 
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY? 
“All military actions are means to achieve certain political objectives, while military 
action itself is a manifested form of politics.” 
—Mao Tse-tung13 
 
Coercive diplomacy and covert action have sometimes been thought of as two 
separate or mutually exclusive strokes of foreign policy. Perhaps this perception stems 
from the lack of discernment that some state policy makers, military or intelligence 
officials collectively share from the limited understanding of actions conducted by 
different organizations and bureaucrats, in part due to the secretive nature of the decision 
processes and the operations themselves. Moreover, conceivably the very nature of their 
definitions and operationalization suggests that coercive diplomacy and covert action are 
so contradistinctive that they cannot possibly be thought of as inclusive, much less one an 
extension of the other. After all, by definition covert action seeks to mask the identity of 
the state actor that sponsored a specific, or series, of antithetical actions towards another 
state actor; whereas, coercive diplomacy is used as a bargaining strategy amongst state 
actors, and as such requires an overtness to effectively communicate their messages to 
affect the other’s decision behavior or actions.14,15,16 Nevertheless, most aims of covert 
action seek to inflict some form of coercive effect on another state actor to dissuade or 
modify their behavior. Why is it then that the two entities are sometimes separated 
completely?  Are coercive diplomacy and covert action really that incompatible, or are 
there instances where the two can work in concert with each other as a form of covert 
coercion (a compound of the two terms)?  More pointedly, in this chapter I will seek to 
                                                
13 Mao Tse-tung as cited by Christopher Felix, A Short Course in the Secret War, 4th ed. (New York: 
Madison Books, 2001), 139. 
14 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 2003), 221. Kindle edition. 
15 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 168. 
16 Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic 
Challenges of Our Time, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 200. 
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outline the U.S.’s primary coercive strategies as I attempt to answer the question: Under 
what conditions might covert coercive diplomacy be used as a viable coercive policy 
option between two state actors in the current interstate system?  In my effort to answer 
this question I will analyze both coercive diplomacy and covert action separately, and 
will then proffer considerations as to when covert coercive diplomacy might be a viable 
option for policy makers. 
A. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 
Several political and military philosophers, both historical and modern, have 
postulated on ideas surrounding coercive diplomacy as it pertains to the use of force and 
statecraft, but coercive diplomacy’s theory has become tricky to manipulate effectively 
with the advent of weapons of mass destruction enabled by technological advances.17  
This technological revolution in destruction has forced policy makers to carefully 
consider ideas involved in threats and use of force in statecraft.18  The danger amongst 
modern state powers in the nuclear age is using too strong of a threat that they are not 
prepared to back up with the use of force, either rendering the threat impotent or leading 
to an unintended escalation containing the inconceivable consequences of mutual 
destruction.   
Schelling offered a very discerning insight into the conceptual centralities that are 
at work in interstate coercion. In his work Arms and Influence, Schelling makes the 
distinction between deterrence as a defensive policy action and compellence as an 
offensive one, albeit both may be achieved through coercive methods such as threats of 
force or its actual use. Moreover, coercive deterrence seeks to prevent or dissuade a state 
from pursuing an action that is counter to the coercing state’s preferences; whereas, 
coercive compellence forces an enemy state to retreat from an action or present course in 
policy that is counter to the coercing state’s desires.19  Ergo, Schelling perceives both 
deterrence and compellence to be similar, but nonetheless distinguishable manifestations 
                                                
17 Lauren, Craig, and George, Force and Statecraft, 199. 
18 Lauren, Craig, and George, Force and Statecraft, 199. 
19 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 70–1. 
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of coercion. Coercion itself may then be defined as the use of threats of force, or some 
form of force itself to either deter or compel another state actor to comply with the 
coercing state’s preferences. 
As one would intuitively assume, coercive diplomacy has two sides to its 
characterization: coercion and diplomacy. As Schelling aptly describes it, “Diplomacy is 
bargaining; it seeks outcomes that, though not ideal for either party, are better for both 
than some of the alternatives.”20  The adjective in the compound term, coercive, speaks to 
the conditions or means by which the bargaining position is leveraged. Coercive 
diplomacy’s ultimate aim is the influence of another state actor’s behavior or decision 
logic. Again, Schelling articulates this concept masterfully: 
To inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing directly; it can only 
make people behave to avoid it. The only purpose, unless sport or revenge, 
must be to influence somebody’s behavior, to coerce his decision or 
choice. To be coercive, violence has to be anticipated. And it has to be 
avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power. To 
exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.21 
Suppositions derived from these descriptions may lead one to assume that coercive 
diplomacy in its most laconic form is a “diplomatic strategy backed by the threat of 
force.”22   
For coercive diplomacy to be used effectively, there are axiomatic principles, 
similar to those used in deterrence theory, which should be respected in coercive 
diplomacy’s application. First, the coercing state must effectively communicate to its 
opposition that there is an asymmetry in motivation pertaining to a posture or decision the 
coercing state is attempting to affect.23  Second, the opponent state must perceive that the 
coercing state has both the capability to act on its communicated threats and that the 
threat itself is credible.24  Third, careful attention should be given to what it is that the 
                                                
20 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1. 
21 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2. 
22 Lauren, Craig, and George, Force and Statecraft, 201. 
23 Lauren, Craig, and George, Force and Statecraft, 201. 
24 Lauren, Craig, and George, Force and Statecraft, 202. 
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coercing state is demanding from the opponent state. In their book Force and Statecraft, 
Paul Lauren, Gordon Craig, and Alexander George amplify, “The demand that an 
adversary stop a particular course of action requires appreciably less than a demand to 
undo whatever has already been gained at the cost of time, money, and perhaps even 
lives.”25  Fourth, a coercing state’s use of positive incentives in conjunction with the 
coercive threats can have a powerful effect on the opponent state’s motivation; restated, 
the use of the ‘carrot’ in conjunction with the ‘stick’ may have a more profound influence 
on the opponent state’s decision reasoning.26  Lastly, practitioners of coercive diplomacy 
should consider what kind of time constraints to impose upon their opponents to meet the 
coercing state’s demands. The coercing state can attempt to force its opponent to respond 
to coercive threats quickly by constraining the demanded timeline, thereby forcing the 
opponent into a crisis situation; or, the coercing state may seek a ‘try-and-see’ approach 
that allows more time for communication and provides it the opportunity to lend 
credibility to the communicated threat by gradually tightening the screws of coercion 
through a tiered progression of force.27 
When searching for a modern historical example in which coercive diplomacy 
was applied, we find an interesting case study analyzed by Frank Harvey and Patrick 
James in their work Deterrence and Compellence in Iraq, 1991–2003. In its pages, the 
authors chronicle the decade long volley of coercive diplomacy exchanges between the 
United States (U.S.) and Iraq. In their conclusion, Harvey and James proffer the key 
observation that each of the diplomatic exchanges involved multiple actors and iterations 
across a complex global security environment.28  As the U.S. continually sought to 
communicate the credibility of its threats, it relied heavily on the acquisition of 
international legitimacy through the United Nations (UN) to substantiate its coercive 
threats. This in turn led to the misperception by Iraq that “legitimacy” and the 
                                                
25 Lauren, Craig, and George, Force and Statecraft, 202. 
26 Lauren, Craig, and George, Force and Statecraft, 202. 
27 Lauren, Craig, and George, Force and Statecraft, 202–3. 
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“credibility” of the threat are one and the same, which ultimately caused Iraq to not take 
the U.S. threat seriously. This miscalculation ultimately led to the failure of coercive 
diplomacy, the demise of Iraq’s leadership, and it underscored the constraints—the 
largest constraint being the collection of an international consensus to legitimize a state’s 
use of force—that state actors operate under in the contemporary interstate system. It is 
these constraints that cause states to circumvent the legitimizing process in the interstate 
system as they work to achieve a coercive effect while avoiding the bureaucratic red tape 
that accompanies overt diplomacy. This then, is the appeal of a covert action strategy.              
B. COVERT ACTION 
Covert action in its practice is nothing new. It is an art as old as antiquity, and its 
modern purpose is not all that different from its ancient form. Covert action seeks to use 
principles of applied force closely associated with acts of war without having to formally 
declare it, and subsequently undergo the bureaucratic process at the domestic and 
international levels inherent of making such a formal declaration. Though there are 
several allures towards covert action’s raison d`être, John Nutter speaks to covert action’s 
principle seductive attraction in his book The CIA’s Black Ops: 
The attraction of covert action is probably inherent in (the U.S.’s) system 
of government. Power is diffuse, and presidential problems tend to be 
complex and full of uncertainty. Covert action promises a simple, or 
“clean,” solution to the problem. It is one of the few exercises of power 
that is largely held within the sole purview of the executive, avoiding the 
need for messy, unsatisfying compromises and the need to answer hard 
questions from congressional committees. ... Finally, covert action offers 
the benefit of limited accountability, for even if it fails, one cannot, 
presumably, be blamed.29 
In the same book, Nutter defines covert action as, “an operation intended to 
change the political policies, actors, or institutions of another country, performed so that 
the covert actor’s role is not apparent, and if that role is discovered, the actor can claim 
he was not involved (this is called plausible deniability).”30  David Tucker and 
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Christopher Lamb also offer a sound definition for the term and its close associates, 
clandestine and paramilitary: 
“Clandestine” typically means the operation itself is hidden in order to 
increase its chances of success, and “covert” means the identity of those 
carrying out the operations and the nation they represent are hidden, or at 
least plausibly deniable. Operations can be both clandestine and covert, 
and often are. Paramilitary typically refers to covert military operations.31 
Lastly, speaking to covert action’s purpose, W. Michael Reisman and James Baker offer 
a similar and parallel description in their book Regulating Covert Action: 
The covert use of the various instruments of strategy, whether proactively 
or reactively (for self-defense or as a countermeasure), with the intention 
of inducing a target to modulate its behavior in ways that henceforth 
discriminate in favor of the state using the strategy [my italics], will, we 
believe, continue to be used. … They appear, alas, to be part of 
contemporary international politics.32 
In the above definitions and descriptions of the terminology, the reader may 
notice that there are similarities between the characterizations of covert action and 
coercive diplomacy. Both methods seek to change the behavior of its opponent at the 
interstate level; moreover, both seek to achieve behavior modification through some 
manifestation of coercion. However, the greatest dissimilarity lies in the word ‘covert’ 
itself. By definition, the action(s) that the word covert describes is to be non-attributing 
thereby giving the sponsor of the actions plausible deniability. Herein lay the paradox 
between coercive diplomacy, which requires effective and frequent communication of a 
threat to achieve a bargaining advantage, and covert action, the plausible coercive 
instrument that may lend credibility to the coercive threat but the action itself cannot be 
publicly claimed. So how might the two still be used together to achieve the same desired 
outcome?  The answer, I believe, lies in another paradoxical truism which is that almost 
all paramilitary covert operations do not remain indefinitely covert.33  Nutter supports 
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this idea in the context of supporting surrogate forces, “If there is an ironclad lesson from 
the secret wars of the last fifty years, it is that these operations always come into the light 
of day.”34  Christopher Felix asserts the same point concerning covert political operations 
also known as state sponsored insurgency—known in the U.S. as unconventional 
warfare—in his book A Short Course in the Secret War, “Taken as a whole, 
unconventional warfare is a political operation, initially covert, then clandestine, and 
finally overt.”35    
Although seemingly counterintuitive, the points that these two authors raise 
suggest that since most forcible covert operations usually wind up overt in the end, the 
coercing state will then likely have to approach each operation as if it were being 
conducted overtly to use covert action responsibly. Critics of this idea may then argue 
what the point of covert action is then if the sponsor cannot remain entirely secretive?  
The answer is fairly straightforward; it allows the president, or similar leader, to fight an 
undeclared war on the cheap. Undeclared in the sense that the leader did not have to go to 
any extended effort to secure domestic and international support to generate a formal 
declaration of war; and cheap in the connotation that if the covert action is conducted on 
a larger scale to induce a greater coercive effect, then proxy armies may be used to 
preserve the military resources of the coercing state.36  Nutter explicates further, “The 
reasons the United States has and will continue to employ proxy armies are the very 
reasons it engages in covert action in the first place. It is always better to use someone 
else’s blood for warfare.”37   
The notion of pursuing forcible covert action instead of pursuing overt coercive 
threats and actions does not require the leader of a democratic state to enlist domestic 
support or legislative consensus to the degree that overt military action might. 
Dissimilarly several scholars debate that all other elements being equal authoritarian or 
autocratic states are not as politically constrained domestically as democratic states in 
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their pursuance of overt coercive measures.38  This idea is salient if one is to consider the 
principal value of covert action as an option that would allow for equilibrium of coercive 
action between the U.S.—a non-disputed democratic state—and another authoritarian or 
autocratic state such as the USSR. I would take the debate further to suggest that because 
a leader of a democratic state maintains their legitimate authority on the basis of 
elections, that leader is more politically constrained domestically than internationally. 
Inversely, the leader of an authoritarian or autocratic state may be more constrained on 
the international level than domestic if the majority of the populace perceives the 
incumbent leader to be legitimate through natural consensus or repressive control 
measures. In either case, covert action provides a democratic leader with the latitude to 
pursue forcible coercive action against another state, largely bypassing the need for 
domestic political consensus. 
The semantic use of the aforementioned term “plausibly deniable” and 
“unacknowledged” also become important in that generally everyone in the world may 
know who is actively conducting forcible covert actions against whom, but the action is 
“non-attributing” in that no one can find the smoking gun that proves that the coercing 
state conducted the action. The state is then able to maintain its international prestige 
without the cost of having to garner ‘legitimate’ international support in the form of a UN 
Security Council resolution. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, it means that 
although an action may formally be called “covert,” this does not preclude a coercing 
state from engaging its opponent vis-à-vis, metaphorically speaking, at the leader level to 
project its carefully crafted message that communicates the threat of coercive actions that 
will soon follow if the opponent state does not remedy their present course. If the 
opponent state were to try and raise the issue with the international community, the 
coercing state may “plausibly deny” that such actions ever took place if it crafted its 
communication equivocally enough.   
This is where the cleverness of a state’s strategic communication becomes 
important. There are several means by which a coercing state may communicate a 
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strategic message to an opponent state so as to correlate what will follow if the opponent 
state does not emend its behavior. This effect can be accomplished similar to the covert 
action itself, through proxies such as unwitting media platforms, bureaucratic back-
channels, or the very indigenous proxy force that the coercing state may be attempting to 
utilize to coerce the opponent state through. Domestic and international public statements 
such as “all military options are on the table” are also effective since they allow the 
opponent state to imagine a wide range of coercive military force options from the overt 
nuclear to the covert state sponsored insurgency. Though the message is indefinite 
enough to allow room for plausible deniability, it is clear enough to let the opponent state 
comprehend that there will be painful consequences if the opponent state does not modify 
its behavior to the liking of the coercing state. The reinforcement and amplification of the 
message comes through the credible demonstration of coercive force—sabotage and 
subversion through proxy forces—synchronized with the strategic messaging. With the 
idea established that coercive diplomacy may be possible through deliberate and shrewd 
strategic messaging further supported by covert coercive actions to lend the message 
credibility, I will now examine the idea of “covert coercion” further to gain 
understanding as to when this method would be conceivable, or even preferred.      
C. COVERT COERCION 
Covert action encompasses a wide array of tasks such as asset development, 
political action, propaganda and disinformation, economic warfare, and paramilitary 
action just to name the main categories.39  Some of these categories can, and often do, 
overlap. For the purposes of this thesis, I will examine only the political and paramilitary 
action categories as they have direct application to the coercion of another state actor. To 
better understand this, we should explore the idea of unconventional warfare further. U.S. 
Army Training Circular 18–01 defines unconventional warfare as, “Activities conducted 
to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a 
government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, 
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and guerrilla force in a denied area.”40  As one might assume from this definition and the 
context of earlier discussion, unconventional warfare operations conducted by the U.S. 
typically involve Special Operations Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. Notice 
that a key task in the above definition includes the term “coerce.”  This is an important 
concept as this definition demonstrates that U.S. SOF believe that they should be able to 
conduct U.S. sponsored insurgency actions, a subset of covert action, to coerce another 
sovereign state or occupying power to comply with U.S. policy demands. However, 
unconventional warfare is an exceptionally difficult and challenging mission to pull off as 
the U.S. has learned hard lessons through a long and distinguished list of political action 
and paramilitary failures—Indonesia 1957–64, Congo 1959–60, and Bay of Pigs 1961 
just to name a few—throughout the years since earnest experimentation with the concept 
began in the early 1950s, the early dawn years of the Cold War.41  Tucker and Lamb 
promulgate some key perceptions to this end, “In some cases, the concern about high 
risks for little effect is justified…independent unconventional warfare missions generally 
are not worthwhile when directed against well-prepared authoritarian regimes.”42  Tucker 
and Lamb go on to further highlight the challenges of unconventional warfare in working 
through indigenous personnel: 
Solving a problem indirectly often means objectives are achieved more 
slowly, with less certainty, and sometimes with questionable methods. … 
Working through other forces invariably means ceding a degree of control 
over behavior. In the case of the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq, 
Special Forces and other U.S. government representatives had to work 
hard to keep the Peshmerga from irritating the government of Turkey by 
pursuing their objective of an independent Kurdistan. SOF can use 
persuasion to guide indigenous forces, making it clear that continued U.S. 
support requires limits on their behavior, but working through third parties 
invariably is tricky business, and SOF must often settle for less than 
optimum outcomes and iron control over tactics in exchange for lower 
overall costs to the United States.43 
Nutter also underscores the dilemma of non-harmonious political objectives: 
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One of the goals of all proxy forces is to openly involve the armed forces 
of the United States. This is, of course, the polar opposite of the aims of 
the United States, which will always seek to avoid these entanglements; 
the CIA engages proxy forces expressly to avoid the boot-sucking morass 
of risking American prestige and bloodshed by involving the armed 
forces…Thus, there is always tension in relations between the United 
States and the nations it uses to fight proxy wars.44 
Given these complexities and challenges, one might wonder when is it ever 
possible, much less conducive, to wage an unconventional warfare campaign to coerce 
another government or occupying power?  Looking at history closer we see that not all of 
the U.S.’s, and other states’, unconventional warfare campaigns ended in abject failure. 
There were in fact some complete and partial successes that occurred. The U.S.’s 
involvement in Tibet from 1956–1971 was somewhat successful in that it harassed the 
People’s Republic of China to gain some modest political bargaining advantages for the 
Nixon administration when it sought to develop Sino-U.S. trade relations in the early 
1970s.45  Another brief success was Iran in 1953 when the CIA engineered the political 
overthrow of the belligerent Mosaddeq in operation AJAX. This enabled the American-
friendly shah to sit in power for a period of 25 years at which point the Islamic 
Revolution forced the shah to abdicate power in 1979.46  Perhaps the greatest success for 
the U.S. though was Afghanistan in the 1980s. Through the CIA and SOF, the U.S. was 
able to wage an unconventional war with the mujahedin to effectively “coerce” the Soviet 
occupying power to abandon its policy in Afghanistan.47   
What were the common threads that enabled these, and others not listed, 
unconventional warfare operations to successfully achieve a covert coercive effect on 
another interstate power?  In A Short Course in the Secret War, Christopher Felix offers 
three characteristics for unconventional warfare to be successful. First, the operation must 
be based on something real; that is to say, some form of latent malcontent towards the 
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current government, or occupying power, must exist amongst potential indigenous 
surrogate forces. The forces themselves do not have to be well organized or equipped, but 
their dissent and cause must be based on something substantive, not superficial or 
passing.48  Second, the operation must be conducted primarily through indigenous 
surrogates if it is not to be rejected outright by the population of the opponent state.49  
Lastly, Felix suggests that “it matters less what you do than how you do it;” restated, you 
cannot conduct these operations halfway, you are either all-in or should not conduct them 
at all.50   
In suggesting when covert coercion might be successful, I would also offer that in 
addition to Felix’s observations the decision frames of the state’s principal decision 
makers also matters a great deal. That is to say to the extent that the coercing state is 
willing to accept risks to pursue covert coercion methods, and the extent that the coerced 
state is able to make concessions from a position of relative loss or gain directly affects 
the decision maker’s strategy in either resisting coercive overtures or making 
concessions. Decision and prospect theories are both helpful in understanding this 
notion—both of which will be explained further in the next chapter. Illustratively 
speaking, some historical examples have shown that indirect approaches using 
unconventional warfare operations in support of indigenous forces working to overthrow 
an occupying, or “imperialist,” power—such was the case in the U.S.’s involvement in 
Afghanistan against the Soviets and Iran’s involvement in Lebanon against Israel—where 
the occupying power is the target of compellence, may have a greater chance of success 
than those conducted directly against the opponent state.  
Having laid out the conditions under which a covert coercion campaign might be 
successful, this brings me back to my original thesis question: Under what conditions 
might covert coercive diplomacy be used as a viable coercive policy option between two 
state actors in the interstate system?  I postulate that covert coercive diplomacy might not 
only be viable, but preferable to overt coercive diplomacy when the coercing state is 
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structurally constrained in either the international or domestic system to gain “legitimate” 
approval for the pursuance of coercive measures defined by force against another state. 
By prosecuting an “undeclared war” through proxy forces, it may be possible for the 
coercing state to achieve the same desirable level of coercive credibility to leverage a 
bargaining advantage necessary for diplomacy to work successfully. Lastly, covert 
coercive diplomacy may be even more operable if it is used to coerce a state that able to 
both make concessions and in a decision frame to do so.  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In summary, in this chapter I have worked to analyze both coercive diplomacy 
and covert action in an effort to examine the relationship between the two and how, if 
possible, covert action can support coercive diplomacy. More precisely, I endeavored to 
discern if there were situations, or conditions, in which covert coercive diplomacy might 
be a more attractive and viable option than overt coercive diplomacy. 
In my research and analysis, I have uncovered several potential deficiencies 
associated with the inappropriate or capricious employment of covert action; especially 
that of political action and paramilitary operations, which are closely associated with 
unconventional warfare. However, I have also contended that under certain conditions 
covert coercive diplomacy may be viable, if not preferable. I posited two such primary 
conditions where covert coercion may be achievable: 1) a domestic or internationally 
constrained environment that does not allow for the coercing state to pursue “legitimate” 
offensive coercive action without losing domestic or international prestige; 2) covert 
coercion may be employed against an opponent state that has both room to make 
concessions to the coercive act and is in a decision frame that fosters concession as 
opposed to incurring the costs of the coercive act.  
While these conditions are in no way categorical or conclusive, they do 
accentuate the possibility that covert action can, and in some cases, should be used as a 
viable complement to coercive diplomacy. In the next chapter I will unpack the theories 
upon which the above deductively reasoned postulates are premised. 
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III. THE THEORY 
“If we pursue the demands that war makes on those who practice it, we come to the 
region dominated by the powers of intellect. War is the realm of uncertainty; three 
quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or 
lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled 
intelligence to scent out the truth.” 
—Carl Von Clausewitz51 
In the previous chapter I introduced the theoretical framework behind the strategy 
of pursuing both overt coercive diplomacy and covert coercion. To fully understand the 
argument presented in this thesis, a summary of three well-established approaches to 
formal modeling upon which the hypotheses are predicated is necessary. Furthermore, a 
decision analysis examination of the utility of covert coercion may only be introduced 
once the logic of decision, Bayesian analysis, prospect, and game theory are all 
unpacked. This chapter’s primary purpose is to outline and explain the governing 
principles and relevant axioms in necessary detail in order to develop the decision 
analysis modeling of covert coercion in Chapter IV. In the first section of the chapter I 
will introduce decision theory as it is traditionally understood in its Bayesian expected 
utility form. Prospect theory and the evolution of contrasts that depart from the traditional 
maximizing of one’s expected utility will be discussed in the second section. The third 
and final section of the chapter will introduce the fundamentals of game theory modeling 
and the synthesis of decision and prospect theory that will determine the value scaling of 
the decision analysis model for covert coercion in Chapter IV. 
A. DECISION THEORY 
Decision theory is a very broad subject. Every human being of all ages makes 
several decisions in the course of every day life. Some decisions are impulsive and made 
in haste while others are made from a more analytical and deliberate process. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that for the majority of the people that have the cognitive 
intelligence to make a discerning decision, there is an element of personal decision logic 
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involved which is influenced by an incalculable amount of external, cultural, and 
physiological factors. It is from this complexity of factors that decision theory attempts to 
simplify and explain how people make rational decisions. Though there are several 
modes of decision theory, for the purposes of this thesis I will only focus on the most 
common in terms of conventional Western rational thought. The first is “traditional” 
Bayesian decision theory. 
B. TRADITIONAL BAYESIAN DECISION THEORY   
In their book Decision, Probability, and Utility Peter Gardenfors and Nils-Eric 
Sahlin describe “traditional” Bayesian decision theory in the most simplistic of factors. 
Gardenfors and Sahlin assert that decisions stem from two main elements: 1) an 
individual’s wants and desires, which in turn determine the decision maker’s values or 
utilities of potential outcomes resultant from the decision; and 2) an individual’s 
information or beliefs about the world environment, which determine the decision 
maker’s assessed probabilities of possible outcomes.52 
Further breaking the components of a logical decision down to its most primitive 
components, Gardenfors and Sahlin enumerate three factors that constitute a decision 
situation. First, for a decision to occur the decision maker must make a choice between 
two or more alternatives or acts.53  In game theory the alternatives are referred to as a 
player’s strategies.54  Second, a decision maker is typically not in complete control over 
all of the factors that determine the outcome of a particular decision, rather another 
component that accounts for the different states of the world environment figure into the 
equation to generate what is referred to as uncertainty in relation to the consequences of a 
player strategy.55  The third and final component of a decision is the different 
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consequences or outcomes resultant from the varying player strategies.56  Ergo, according 
to Gardenfors and Sahlin, “A decision situation is thus determined by the sets of 
alternatives, states, and outcomes.”57 
Having enumerated the components of a decision, Gardenfors and Sahlin identify 
four fundamental and necessary assumptions in “traditional” Bayesian decision theory, 
the first of which addresses how the player’s strategies in a decision should be 
evaluated.58  The first assumption values of outcomes supposes that a utility measure in 
the form of numerical values are associated with each outcome of a given decision 
situation for each player.59  The values of outcomes assumption is common to not only 
most decision theories, game theory also ascribes numeric value to the utility of the 
various outcomes of a given decision situation as we will examine later.60  Gardenfors 
and Sahlin provide amplifying commentary pertaining to the purpose of numeric utility 
measure involving values of outcomes: 
The purpose of utility measure is to reflect not only the ordinal preferences 
between the possible outcomes, but also the corresponding numerical 
value differences. It is not only of interest to know [the ordinal 
preferences], but also exactly how strong this preference is.61 
The second assumption is closely related to the first. The values of alternatives 
assumption holds that only information pertaining to a decision maker’s wants and 
desires influence the utility values associated with each decision alternative.62  It should 
be noted here that this is perceived to be a great limitation of “traditional” Bayesian 
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decision theory in that no consideration for risk and other external factors that have 
bearing on values of outcomes to a decision maker.63 
The third assumption information about states considers the perceptions and 
beliefs of the decision maker about the states of the world in a given decision situation. 
The information about states assumption embraces the notion that a decision maker’s 
perceptions are then represented by a subjective probability measure defined over the 
states.64,65   
Lastly, Gardenfors and Sahlin identify a fourth assumption necessary to 
“traditional” Bayesian decision theory, probabilistic independence. This assumption 
simply states that the probability of the state, or environment, is independent of the 
alternative, or player strategy, chosen.66   
Collectively all of the above four assumptions will allow for the decision maker to 
calculate the expected utility of each decision alternative or player strategy. In the book A 
First Course in Mathematical Modeling, Frank Giordano defines expected value—value 
is sometimes used interchangeably with utility in this context—in technical terms: 
Suppose a game has outcomes a1, a2, ... , an each with a payoff w1, w2, … , 
wn and a corresponding probability p1, p2, … , pn  where p1 + p2 + … + pn 
= 1 and 0 ≤  pi  ≤	 1, then the quantity 
E = w1p1 + w1p2 + … + w1pn 
is the expected value of the game.67 
In “traditional” Bayesian decision theory the “rational” decision maker will almost 
always seek to maximize the expected utility. Restated, the decision alternative, or player 
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strategy, that offers the maximal expected utility should be the alternative of choice to the 
decision maker.68 
Until recently, maximizing expected utility has long been a preferred method by 
economists, political scientists, and other social scientists to analyze a “rational” decision 
maker’s logic. However, there are some fundamental shortcomings for solely relying on 
the MEU criterion. Principally the MEU method—as it is established on the assumptions 
above—gives little consideration for “risk” involved in singular decisions. Risk is a 
critical attribute to consider when analyzing a player’s decision logic as it captures the 
costs and dangers associated with choosing a wrong alternative, or strategy, in the state of 
a decision situation. In moving forward in the decision analysis of covert coercion, risk is 
a component that should be of paramount consideration as the costs associated with 
choosing a wrong strategy are defined in blood and treasure that figures in the millions 
and billions of U.S. dollars.  
Again in the book A First Course in Mathematical Modeling, Frank Giordano 
defines decision theory as, “… a collection of mathematical models and tools developed 
to assist people in choosing among alternative actions in complex situations involving 
chance and risk.”69  The important elements to note in this definition are two-fold: 1) 
decision analysis often occurs in complex situations, and 2) chance and risk are present 
factors in several decisions. Again, while MEU gives credence to chance it does little to 
consider substantial risk of one-time decisions. Frank Giordano elaborates, “Certainly, if 
you are repeating the decision many times, over the long haul maximizing your expected 
value is very appealing. But, even then, there may be instances when you want to 
consider explicitly the risk involved.”70  In addressing this issue, Giordano asserts the 
idea of using alternative decision criteria that gives fair situational consideration to the 
decision maker’s objectives, chance, and risk involved.71 
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To further expound upon Giordano’s proposed alternative decision criteria, the 
Figure 1 decision matrix illustration taken from Frank Giordano’s book will be used: 
 
Figure 1.  Investment strategy versus nature illustration.72 
Using the example shown in Figure 1 Giordano offers several alternative decision 
criteria in lieu of MEU. However, for the purposes of this thesis I will only describe the 
maximin alternative criterion. The maximin criterion is focused on gaining the best 
possible outcome under the “worst case” scenario conditions. The maximin criterion is 
also assumed by most game theorists to be the default criterion for game theoretic model 
players. Under the conservative maximin criterion the minimum outcome value is 
considered for each strategy and then the maximum value of each of the minima is 
selected.73  It is the maximum of the minima, ergo the term maximin.74  Illustrated in the 
Figure 1 example, the minimums for each strategy “A” through “D” are “0,” “1,” “0,” 
and “0” respectively. Taking the maximum value of the minima leads us to choose 
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Investment Strategy vs. Nature decision matrix to illustrate the elements inherent to all of Giordano’s 
proposed alternative decision criteria. To summarize Giordano’s descriptions as succinctly and clearly as 
possible, I have elected to utilize the same decision problem illustration. 
73 Giordano et al., A First Course in Mathematical Modeling, 370.   
74 Giordano et al., A First Course in Mathematical Modeling, 370.   
E F G H 
A 2 2 0 1 
B 1 1 1 1 
C 0 4 0 0 
D 1 3 0 0 
*Predicted values for a 5-year investment for alternative investment 
strategies (A-D) as a function of the nature of the economy (E-H). 
Nature of the Economy 
Your Plan 
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strategy “B” yielding a value of “1.”75  Giordano expounds on the conservative nature of 
this profit strategy, “The maximin strategy is pessimistic in that it chooses the strategy 
based only on the worst case for each strategy under consideration, completely neglecting 
the better cases that could result.”76 
The alternative maximin decision criterion is ideal to consider when examining 
the decision behavior and logic of interstate coercion. Notwithstanding, this alternative 
decision criterion alone is not adequate to elucidate the decision logic of covert coercion. 
A more thorough understanding of how a decision maker cognitively processes risk to 
decide on a given player strategy is needed. This problem is best addressed through the 
lens of prospect theory. 
C. PROSPECT THEORY 
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky broke new ground in the world of 
social sciences and decision analysis by formulating what has emerged as the leading 
alternative to expected utility as a model to explain decision behavior under risk.77  
Kahneman and Tversky, two behavioral psychologists with backgrounds in economics 
and mathematics, believed that expected utility was flawed as a normative standard for 
describing the decision behavior of “rational” actors. Specifically, Kahneman and 
Tversky were taken by the large amount of documented incongruences in decision 
experiments that analyzed the decision behavior of observed subjects juxtaposed with 
what the decisions should have been according to the axioms of MEU.78  Kahneman and 
Tversky argued in their innovative article “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk” that MEU assumes that a decision maker will rationally decide on a strategy 
that results in an outcome that optimizes the decision maker’s net asset levels.79  As was 
discussed in the previous section of this chapter, the MEU method functions well for the 
                                                
75 Giordano et al., A First Course in Mathematical Modeling, 370.   
76 Giordano et al., A First Course in Mathematical Modeling, 370.   
77 Jack S. Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (1992): 171, 
accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/3791677. 
78 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 263. 
79 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 171.  
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decision maker that is interested in long-term outcomes over several hundred decision 
iterations where the probabilities are either known or can be logically deduced in the 
stochastic realm of chance. However, decisions in the domain of international policy 
seldom occur recurrently over hundreds of iterations and the probabilities are seldom 
known in the objective and calculated sense due to the complexity of human cognitive 
psychology.   
For example, consider a hypothetical “Deal or No Deal” game show situation 
where you are the contestant and you have a choice between two final briefcases that you 
and the banker know to contain either the $1,000,000 prize or the worst possible outcome 
of $0. In the final round of play with only the two briefcases left, the banker has made 
you an offer of $400,000 if you choose to not play the game any further. In deciding 
whether to take to deal or not you could apply a couple different decision criteria. In 
applying the MEU decision criterion you would arrive at the following expected value: 
EV = $1,000,000 (1/2) + $0 (1/2) = $500,000 
Therefore, according to MEU criterion the rational choice would be to choose “No Deal” 
and continue play for the $1,000,000, as $500,000 is greater than the banker’s offer of 
$400,000. However, because this is a one-time decision and the risk of attaining an 
outcome of $0 is considerable after you have successfully played the game thus far, your 
risk averse nature may lead you to apply the more conservative maximin decision 
criterion instead. Using this criterion, the minima of your two choices are the $400,000 if 
you were to make a “Deal,” or $0 if you to choose “No Deal.”  The maxima of the 
minima would then be the $400,000 offer, which would require a rational choice of 
accepting the banker’s deal. Both decisions could be considered “rational” depending 
upon which decision criterion is being applied and your perspective of the interplay 
between chance and risk. It is in the void between chance and risk that Kahneman and 
Tversky’s prospect theory offers the best explanation for one-time decision making under 
risk. 
Prospect theory envisages a new brand of thought with regard to risk. The central 
hypothesis to prospect theory conceives that individuals are more risk averse in their 
decision behavior with respect to gains and are more risk acceptant with respect to 
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losses.80  In his article “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” John Levy aptly describes 
the fundamental difference of prospect theory from expected utility, “Prospect theory 
posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference 
point rather than with respect to net asset levels …”81 With the central hypothesis of 
prospect theory defined it is necessary to outline the foundations and process of prospect 
theory to enable an understanding of how decision frames affect decision behavior. 
There are six axiomatic foundations to prospect theory’s hypothesis: Reference 
Point, Reflection Effect, Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect, Framing, Certainty 
Effect, and the Isolation Effect. Each foundation will be discussed in modest length to 
provide the reader a rudimentary knowledge of the driving factors deterministic of 
decision behavior under risk. 
Reference Point. As was pointed out, individuals are inclined to deliberate 
decisions from a perspective considerate of either gains or losses and not net assets as 
expected utility would assume.82  Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky posit that 
individuals attribute more value to the change in assets and not the aggregate itself.83  In 
considering this idea, it is important to note that Kahneman and Tversky are not 
supportive of the notion that an individual’s outcome preference order of prospective 
outcomes are significantly altered by small or moderate changes to the individual’s 
assets.84  The reference point then usually refers to an individual’s perceived status quo 
in asset position prior to any potential changes that occur resultant from a prospective 
outcome.85  In addition to the status quo, the reference point may also be the aspiration 
level of the individual that is not equivalent to the status quo. The aspiration level 
scenario is governed by how the decision maker frames the decision situation—the 
                                                
80 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 171. 
81 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 171. 
82 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 174. 
83 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 273. 
84 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 277. 
85 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 174. 
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framing foundation discusses this idea further.86  To illustrate the reference point, 
consider the hypothetical value function shown in Figure 2. The graph shows the 
shallower change in slope with regards to value function for gains demonstrating loss 
aversion vis-à-vis the much steeper slope for the value function on the losses side 
suggesting greater risk acceptance. The reference point would then be a decision maker’s 
perceived status quo—or aspired level—along the value function. The decision maker 
may then be risk averse initially if their reference point is on the gains side, and 
conversely risk accepting if the decision maker perceives him or herself to be on the 
losses side of the x-axis. 
The selection of the reference point, whether it is the status quo or an aspiration 
level, is largely dependent upon how the decision is framed.87  This is Kahneman and 
Tversky’s idea of “reference dependence,” which replaces the notion of net assets defined 
by an expected utility function by instead using a reference point defined by a value 
function similar to the one displayed in Figure 2.88  The idea of reference dependence is 
critical towards explicating the hypothesis that individuals overvalue losses relative to 
comparable gains.89  This loss aversion is depicted in Figure 2 by the steeper slope of the 
value function on the losses side juxtaposed to the shallower slope of the value function 
on the gains side. 
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87 Brett A. DeAngelis, “A Line in the Sand: Prospect Theory and Nash Arbitration in Resolving 
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88 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for 
International Conflict,” International Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (1996): 181, accessed February 19, 
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Figure 2.  A hypothetical value function.90 
Reflection Effect. The reflection effect is a foundation built around the 
aforementioned reference point. The reflection effect posits that an individual’s utility 
function is convex in the domain of gains and concave in the domain of losses and is 
reflective around the reference point as is depicted in Figure 2.91  Principally this implies 
that an individual’s sensitivity to changes in assets decreases in both the domain of gains 
and losses as the individual moves further away from their previously established 
reference point.92  A simple illustration of this idea can be found in food. Consider a 
large slice of pizza for dinner when an individual has not eaten since breakfast. Hungry, 
the individual’s desire for the pizza is at a considerable level. After the first bite, the 
individual’s desire for the pizza is still great, but marginally less than it was before the 
first bite of pizza was taken. With each ensuing bite the individual’s appetite becomes 
more and more satiated and as a consequence their desire for the pizza becomes less and 
less. Similarly, as one moves from their initial reference point, the sensitivity to changes 
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in gains or losses will decrease; just as the desire resultant from a quenched appetite 
became less in the illustration. 
Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect. The loss aversion foundation has 
already been alluded to in the discussion of reference point and reflection effect. Building 
up to now it was suggested that gains are treated differently than losses in that losses 
loom larger than gains.93 John Levy best articulates loss aversion as the idea “… that 
people prefer the status quo (or another reference point) over a 50/50 chance for positive 
and negative alternatives with the same absolute value. It also implies that people value 
what they have more than ‘comparable things they do not have.’”94  In acquiring an asset, 
the very act of owning the new object enhances the value of the object in the mind of the 
owner. The process of ascribing a higher value to the asset by virtue of it being in the 
possession of the individual is what is described as the endowment effect.95    
The endowment effect is a stumbling block for utility theorists because it violates 
the principle of transitivity of preferences. Restated, if an individual prefers object A over 
object B but then comes into ownership of object B, according to the endowment effect 
the individual will now prefer object B over object A thus making the preference order 
inconsistent and therefore intransitive.96  With regards to the endowment effect it should 
also be noted that the length of time that an individual possesses an asset and the level of 
exertion by the individual to acquire the asset would increase the asset’s value all the 
more in the mind of the owner.97  This is a key consideration when attempting to discern 
a decision maker’s potential decision frame.     
Framing. The framing foundation is an extremely important and salient concept 
for this thesis. Framing is best described as the location of the reference point along the 
decision maker’s value function before a decision is made.98  Framing the decision 
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situation ultimately determines whether or not the decision maker will view the choice at 
hand through a gains frame or a loss frame. The difference is critical since the decision 
frame through which the problem is perceived will ultimately determine if the decision 
maker is more risk accepting or risk averse. 
It should be noted that an individual’s reference point changes over time as was 
alluded to in the endowment effect discussion. How quickly a person’s reference point 
recalibrates or renormalizes to the acquisition of an object becomes a key consideration 
as it is determinant of whether or not the individual views the object from a gains frame 
or loss frame. To this point Brett DeAngelis writes in his thesis that, “Accommodating to 
losses creates risk aversion (feeling no need to recover sunk costs) and accommodating to 
gains creates risk seeking (to keep the gains recently acquired).”99  Further illustrating 
this idea Jack Levy writes: 
Is the reference point for each choice problem framed cumulatively with 
respect to one’s asset position at the beginning of the series of choices, or 
with respect to one’s asset position at each individual choice?  A gambler 
who sustains a series of losses will be more inclined to be risk acceptant if 
he or she adopts the cumulative frame of the asset position at the 
beginning of the evening and attempts to recover the losses, whereas on 
who uses current asset levels would be more risk averse. Someone on a 
winning streak, however, will be more risk averse if he or she frames the 
choice in terms of initial assets rather than total assets at the time of each 
new bet.100 
Certainty Effect. Similar to the endowment effect, the certainty effect holds that a 
person will overweight outcomes that are certain juxtaposed to outcomes that have an 
element of probability to them.101  Moreover, decision makers are likely to overweight 
smaller probabilities and underweight larger probabilities in comparison.102  This concept 
also interacts with the reflection effect to reinforce risk accepting behavior in the domain 
of losses and risk averse behavior in the domain of gains.103 
                                                
99 DeAngelis, “A Line in the Sand,” 13. 
100 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 177. 
101 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 178. 
102 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 178. 
103 Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining,” 185. 
 34 
Isolation Effect. The isolation effect is the idea that people attempt to simplify a 
choice between alternatives by disregarding the similar components or attributes that 
each alternative share, and instead focus on the attributes that distinguish the 
alternatives.104  In doing so, the decision process may result in inconsistent preferences 
due to the reality that prospective alternatives can be decomposed into common and 
distinguishing attributes multiple ways; the different categorizations could then lead to 
differing order of preferences.105 
With the foundations of prospect theory now defined it is possible to discuss the 
prospect theory process. According to John Levy, there are two distinct phases to the 
prospect theory decision process: an editing phase followed by an evaluation phase.106  
The editing phase is the preliminary analysis of a decision situation by the decision 
maker. It includes identifying choice alternatives, the assessed consequences with 
choosing each alternative, and the self-ascribed values and probabilities to each 
outcome.107  During the editing phase a decision maker codes the outcomes as either 
gains or losses thus establishing the decision maker’s reference point along the value 
function for the decision.108  The decision maker also simplifies the choice by rounding 
off probabilities or outcomes which includes discounting extremely unlikely outcomes 
altogether by rounding their probability to zero.109  This leads to the combination and 
segregation of probabilities where alternatives that have identical prospects can have 
their probabilities combined and similarly riskless components of the alternatives can be 
segregated out to allow only the components of alternatives that bear risk to be 
evaluated.110  Also important to the editing process is the detection of dominance where 
the decision maker searches for, identifies, and then eliminates dominated alternatives.111  
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This is also a process espoused by game theory. Lastly during the editing phase, the 
cancellation of irrelevant alternatives or decision components occurs due to the 
aforementioned isolation effect.112   
The evaluation phase is the process by which the now edited prospective decision 
alternatives are evaluated, leading to the choosing of the preferred alternative.113  To 
evaluate the remaining alternatives the decision maker processes the decision alternatives 
in a value and/or weighting function process.114  The value function evaluation places the 
emphasis on the value of the outcome from either a gains or losses domain reference 
point shown in Figure 2. The weighting function takes into account the decision maker’s 
ascribed probability weight to a given alternative, which is heavily influenced by the 
aforementioned prospect theory foundations. The more likely an outcome is assessed to 
be, the heavier the weighting of the value for the outcome will be.115 
I believe the integration of prospect theory principles—namely that of decision 
framing in terms of either a gains frame or a loss frame—as a decision theory substitute 
for expected utility is requisite to fully appreciate the decision analysis for strategic 
policies commensurate with interstate compellence. The integration of prospect theory 
and game theory in the fields of political science and international relations is not new. 
Political scientist and modern deterrence theorist Jeffrey Berejikian recognized the limits 
of traditional expected utility as a model for international relations theory in his 
groundbreaking journal article “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence:” 
Increasingly, the use of classic rationality as a foundation for international 
relations theory—or any political theory—is contested. Time constraints, 
huge amounts of information, and uncertainty, combined with cognitive 
limitations, make it difficult for foreign policy actors to evaluate all 
possible scenarios and make a universally rational choice.116 
                                                
112 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 180. 
113 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 180. 
114 DeAngelis, “A Line in the Sand,” 19. 
115 DeAngelis, “A Line in the Sand,” 19. 
116 Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 
(March 2002): 167, accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/1555297. 
 36 
In his piece, Berejikian incorporates prospect theory as the model of rational 
thought into his deterrence game models to suggest a new model for deterrence behavior 
that is not based upon classic rationality explained by expected utility; rather, a model 
based upon that subjectivity of decision making from a gains and losses perspective. As 
Berejikian incorporated prospect theory as the underpinning model for rational choice of 
policy decision makers in his deterrence model, I am attempting to do the same in the 
model of covert coercion.   
It should be noted here that Berejikian offers the critical observation that prospect 
theory does not predict the content of the decisional frame, that is, whether a decision 
maker views the status quo from a gains or loss decision frame.117  Berejikian goes on to 
say that it is the state’s empirical assessment of the status quo that will determine a state 
actor’s deduction of the decision frames in relation to another state actor.118  
The decision framing based upon Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory will 
serve as the foundation in determining how both the U.S. and a hypothetical Rogue State 
will perceive each decision alternative and their corresponding outcomes. Moreover, the 
ordinal values ascribed to preferences of outcomes in the game theoretic models will also 
largely be determined by prospect theory foundation principles. However, before the 
models of covert coercion can be analyzed through the prospect theory lens it is 
necessary to briefly describe the theory behind the game models. 
D. GAME THEORY 
Like decision theory, game theory has a very large general scope that is applicable 
throughout the entire social sciences field of study. Albeit, I will only discuss the portions 
of game theory that are relevant to the covert coercion models of conflict that will be 
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introduced in Chapter IV. Game theory is principally the study of mathematical models 
of conflict and cooperation between intelligent and rational decision makers.119  To this 
end game theory is largely used in the study and analysis of strategic decision-making. 
Game theory is a unique manifestation of decision theory in that it is interactive in nature 
between two or more actors—or players in game theory parlance. Central to the analyses 
that game theory models advance is the notion that the decision alternative, or strategy, 
that a player chooses is largely contingent upon the strategies and choices of the other 
player(s). This interplay of strategies and players has led some scholars to label game 
theory as Interactive Decision theory or Conflict Analysis as potentially more descriptive 
vernacular.120  Whatever the nomenclature may be it is largely indisputable that game 
theory modeling has contributed much intellectual value to the social sciences 
community and will assumedly contribute a great deal more. 
Game theory is a relatively new concept. It first appeared in the early part of the 
20th century with mathematician John von Neumann as the most notable of the founding 
game theorist patriarchs.121  Game theory’s evolution and development exploded during 
World War II and the ensuing decade, and it was found that game theory was very useful 
in modeling interactive decision models in economics, political science, and international 
relations. It was during this period that expected utility was the largely undisputed 
standard for rational decision making. The integration of more contemporary and more 
nebulous decision theories of human psychological cognition, such as prospect theory, 
are relatively new in comparison. Nonetheless, the tenets of game theory are very firm 
and established. 
According to mathematician Philip Straffin a game is defined as any situation in 
which: 
• There are at least two players.122 
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• Each player has a set of possible alternatives, or strategies, which are 
courses of action that the player may decide upon.123 
• The strategies selected by all of the players determine the outcome of the 
game.124 
• A numerical utility value, or payoff, is associated with each possible 
outcome for each individual player.125  The payoff can be either an ordinal 
preference positive integer value or cardinal preference integer value. 
It should be noted here that there two primary argued limitations against game 
theory modeling. The first argument is that the “real-world” is immeasurably complex 
and any model of a “real-world game” would not be adequate to account for all of the 
decision stakeholders and their preferences, delineate all conceivable strategies available 
to each player, or assign true payoffs reflective of each player in the process. 
Notwithstanding, defenders of game theory modeling suggest that the purpose is to 
construct a simple game that models the most relevant variables of a “real” decision 
situation to gain understanding through the thoughtful analysis of a simplified expression 
and not through the reconstruction of reality itself.126  The second argued limitation is 
that game theory assumes that all players are rational. Rationality is defined as a player’s 
ability to logically analyze the best decision strategy towards achieving the player’s ends 
while simultaneously assuming that the other game players are logically analyzing their 
respective strategies as well.127  As was discussed with prospect theory, until recently 
rationality was thought of in terms of expected utility. That notion was challenged in past 
two decades by leading social sciences theorists and has shown that rational (expected 
utility) and cognitive choice can coexist as complementary parts of the larger whole.128   
Though there are multiple and diverse game structures in game theory, the most 
predominant are matrix form games and extensive form games—which resemble 
traditional Bayesian probability decision trees. This thesis will only use matrix form 
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games. The matrix format is an accommodating model structure for two players. 
Although it is possible to assess games for three or more players in the matrix form, the 
game becomes increasingly complex to analyze and solve. This thesis will only examine 
the two principal players in the covert coercion model: the U.S. and a hypothetical Rogue 
State that is the target of U.S. compellence. To better illustrate the structure of a two-
player matrix game model consider the diagram shown in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3.  Sample 2 x 3 matrix format game model. 
In the Figure 3 sample matrix game there are two players: a row player named 
“Rose” and a column player named “Colin.”  The matrix indicates that Rose has two 
player strategies (A and B) while Colin similarly has three strategies (C, D, and E) in 
comparison. The payoffs for each player are located in each of the corresponding matrix 
fields representative of all of the outcomes resultant from each combination of player 
strategies. The row player’s payoffs are always listed first (demonstrated by Rose’s 
payoffs shown in blue) while the column player’s payoffs are listed last (demonstrated by 
Colin’s payoffs shown in red). For example, if we were to play the game in Figure 3 
where Rose chooses her “A” player strategy and Colin chooses to play his “C” strategy, 
the outcome of the game would result in a payoff of “1” for Rose and “5” for Colin in 
accordance with their utility values defined for the game. 
C D E 
A (1, 5) (2, 1) (-3, 0) 








To analyze a matrix game a movement diagram can be used to find an equilibrium 
outcome solution to the game. An equilibrium outcome, as it will be used in this thesis, 
can be defined as the solution point in the matrix where neither player is able to 
unilaterally improve their position. Using a movement diagram to show how each of the 
player’s payoffs interacts in the matrix will identify the equilibrium outcome in the most 
direct manner. An example of how a movement diagram is applied to find the 
equilibrium outcome is illustrated in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4.       Sample 2 x 3 game matrix with movement diagram and equilibrium 
outcome. 
In Figure 4 the colored directional arrows associated with each of the players 
represent the movement diagram. The directional arrows indicate how each player can 
improve their respective payoff outcomes dependent upon which strategy the other player 
chooses. For example, if Colin chooses his “C” strategy then Rose can improve her 
outcome by playing her “B” strategy resulting in a payoff of “2” for Rose. Similarly, if 
Rose chooses to play her “B” strategy then Colin can achieve his best outcome by opting 
to play his “D” strategy resulting in a payoff of “4” for Colin. By applying the directional 
arrows of the movement diagram for all of the players’ strategies we see that there are no 
arrows exiting from the “B-D” cell. This is the point at which no player can unilaterally 
improve their payoff position without a strategic move or arbitrated solution. This point is 
C D E 
A (1, 5) (2, 1) (-3, 0) 








called an equilibrium outcome, as it is the inevitable stable solution to the game. Also of 
note, the movement diagram shows that Rose has a dominant strategy of “B.”  Strategy 
“B” is said to dominate strategy “A” if every outcome corresponding to strategy “B” is 
greater than or equal to respective corresponding outcomes in strategy “A,” and at least 
one outcome in “B” is strictly greater than the corresponding outcome in “A.”129  The 
significance of a dominant strategy is that it presupposes that a player with a dominant 
strategy will always play their dominant strategy during zero-sum games of total conflict 
or partial conflict games without communication—if the player is indeed rational. 
There are several other components and dimensions to game theory modeling 
such as: mixed strategy solutions; zero-sum games of total conflict; and strategy solutions 
that use sequential moves, threats and promises, and Nash arbitration to achieve a Pareto 
optimal outcome. Nevertheless, the tenets discussed thus far will suffice to enable the 
reader to understand the covert coercion model. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced the core theories foundational to the models of conflict 
pursuant of analyzing the relevant decision frames for practitioners of interstate coercive 
policy. Decision theory was presented as a broad domain that seeks to analyze the logic 
of complex decisions. In the tradition of Bayesian decision theory, MEU has long been 
defended as the gold standard for explaining rational decision logic. However, MEU is 
limited in its ability to fully incorporate the cognitive dimension of human decision 
behavior in one-time decisions under risk where the probabilities of chance are not 
known or subjectively ascribed at best. As an alternative to MEU, Frank Giordano 
suggests an alternate decision criterion—maximin—that is calibrated towards the decision 
frame of the individual. Additionally, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect 
theory offers a compelling alternative model for rational decision behavior under risk. 
Unlike MEU, prospect theory posits that individuals do not think of outcomes in terms of 
net assets gained towards maximizing one’s utility; rather, people tend to think more in 
terms of gains and losses when it comes to risk. Furthermore, prospect theory suggests 
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that individuals are prone to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, and will 
likely be risk averse in the domain of gains contrasted with a more risk accepting 
behavior in the losses domain. The result is that the decision maker will operate in either 
a gains frame or a loss frame in relation to their reference point when the decision maker 
is cognitively analyzing a choice between prospective alternatives. Consequently, the 
decision frame is critical to determining a decision maker’s risk behavior and valued 
preferences when he or she is considering one-time decisions under risk. Lastly, elements 
of game theory modeling were discussed to familiarize the reader with concepts that will 
be needed to understand the decision analysis of the covert coercion models in the next 
chapter.    
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IV. THE COVERT COERCION MODEL OF CONFLICT 
“He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious. Such is 
the art of manoeuvring.”—Sun Tzu130 
 
“To a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape. Do not press an enemy at 
bay.”—Sun Tzu131 
 
“Wild beasts, when at bay, fight desperately. How much more is this true of men!  If they 
know there is no alternative they will fight to the death.”—Prince Fu Ch’ai132 
 
The previous two chapters introduced the relevant substantive and methodological 
literature. This chapter will analyze the theory of covert coercion through the 
development of a game theoretic model, informed by the insights of prospect theory, and 
applied to four separate covert coercion decision frame models to answer this thesis’s 
research question: Under what decision frames and political conditions might covert 
coercion by means of unconventional warfare be a viable United States coercive policy 
option?   
A. COVERT COERCION GAME HYPOTHESES 
The first hypothesis introduced in Chapter I posited that the decision frames—
gains frame or loss frame—of the coercion game actors will largely determine either the 
success or failure of a covert coercion policy.133  Prospect theory was used to validate the 
logic of decision frames, which are determinant of a state actor’s perception of outcomes 
and the risk associated with high stakes, one-time decisions. Hypotheses 1.a and 1.b were 
initially explored in Chapter II’s discussion of domestic and international political 
constraints that might influence a U.S. policy maker to choose either overt coercive 
                                                
130 SunTzu, The Art of War (China: circa 544–496 BC, repr. with ed., trans., introduction and preface 
notes by Samuel B. Griffith, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 106. Kindle edition. 
131 SunTzu, The Art of War, 109–10.  
132 SunTzu, The Art of War, 110. 
133 Hypothesis 1: The decision frames of the coercion actors largely determine the success or failure of 
covert coercion.  
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diplomacy or covert coercion as a coercive policy option.134135  If a U.S. policy decision 
maker is constrained more domestically than authoritarian or autocratic states by virtue of 
the U.S.’s democratic nature, then covert coercion may be a more attractive tool of 
compellence for consideration. In the context of prospect theory decision frames, the U.S. 
policy maker operates under the greatest domestic constraint when political conditions 
are relatively favorable for the incumbent U.S. Presidential administration thereby closely 
aligning the decision maker with a gains frame mentality that is risk averse. Conversely, 
the U.S. policy maker may be more aligned with a loss frame when political conditions 
are adverse due to the U.S.’s feeling threatened as it was with the extreme examples of 
Pearl Harbor during WWII and the more recent 9/11 attacks. In these conditions, the 
domestic opinion would favor a more risk accepting military action to coerce the alleged 
antagonistic state. Thus, the interaction of domestic and international political constraints 
and perceptions of the state’s prestige and legitimacy will largely determine whether or 
not the critical decision makers are in either a gains or loss decision frame in the covert 
coercion game.   
The discussion of prospect theory’s foundational principles also reflect that the 
reference point of a decision maker’s value function can recalibrate to change their 
decision frame over time. This corroborates what was conjectured in Hypothesis 1.c.136   
Hypothesis 2 proposed that a coerced state must have room to make concessions 
if a compellence policy of any kind is to be successful.137  Restated, if interstate coercion 
targets a rogue state’s gains (i.e., the Rogue State’s occupation of a third party state), it 
will be more likely to elicit behavior modification, or gain concessions, than if covert 
coercion were to target a rogue state’s losses (i.e., the threat of overthrow/regime change 
                                                
134 Hypothesis 1.a: Domestic and international political constraints, probabilities of outcomes, and 
perceptions of prestige and legitimacy determine an actor’s decision frame.   
135 Hypothesis 1.b: A state actor’s decision frame is determinant in which coercion/response strategy 
the actor pursues. 
136 Hypothesis 1.c: The decision frames of the coercion actors can change through time. 
137 Hypothesis 2: A coerced state must have room to make concessions. 
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within the Rogue State), where the Rogue State is less able to make concessions.138139  
As the war theorist Sun Tzu opined, you must always leave your enemy a way out lest 
they fight to the death because there is nothing to lose otherwise.140  Prospect theory 
described this phenomenon from a loss decision frame standpoint where the decision 
behavior is very risk accepting. However, if the enemy state were to have an acceptable 
way to make concessions from a reference point position in the gains domain, then the 
decision behavior of the enemy state would be more risk averse and therefore less willing 
to incur additional costs resultant from the compellence action. Collectively, these two 
hypotheses and sub-hypotheses are essential to the construct of the coercion model game. 
B. COVERT COERCION GAME ASSUMPTIONS 
Like all models, there must be a few critical assumptions upon which the valued 
outcomes of the models are based. The assumptions are made to fill the information gap 
that exists barring the polling of state actor decision makers, and apart from the 
assumptions there is no absolute way of discerning what each player’s ordinal 
preferences may be in each model situation.141  Therefore, the ordinal values must be 
derived from the following rational player behavioral assumptions that I define to be 
transitive in nature with the first assumption listed as the most valued, and the third the 
least:  
1. The prestige, reputation, and credibility of the state’s government, both 
domestically and in the international system, are of paramount value to 
both states. 
2. Each state prefers the ability to act as responsively and decisively as 
possible to a perceived security threat. 
                                                
138 Hypothesis 2.a: If covert coercion targets a rogue state’s gains (i.e., occupation of a third party 
state), it will be more likely to compel behavior modification, or gain concessions. 
139 Hypothesis 2.b: If covert coercion targets a rogue state’s losses (i.e., threatening overthrow/regime 
change), where the rogue state is less able to make concessions, compellence will likely not be achieved.  
140 Thomas Schelling also recognizes this truism in his seminal work Arms and Influence. See 
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 45, 48. 
141 Leo J. Blanken, Rational Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 34. Kindle edition. 
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3. Each state prefers to have a “justice of cause” perception of its actions 
amongst its domestic population first, and the international community 
second. 
With these assumptions in mind we can now define the games to determine strategies for 
both the U.S. as the coercer, and a target “Rogue State” as the coerced.  
C. COVERT COERCION GAME PLAYER STRATEGIES 
In each of the four covert coercion models there will be a set of alternatives, or 
player strategies, that both the U.S. and its hypothetical Rogue State opponent can choose 
from. Each model pre-supposes that: 1) the U.S. has already elected to pursue a policy of 
compellence against the Rogue State, and 2) there is an active insurgent resistance force 
operating against the Rogue State in an effort to either affect regime change or gain 
political concessions substantive enough to mollify the resistance force’s political 
objectives.   
Given this proposed scenario, the models will afford the U.S. decision maker with 
two player strategies: 1) compel the Rogue State through the use of overt coercive 
diplomacy, or 2) compel the Rogue State through the use of covert coercion UW 
methods. In response to the U.S.’s coercive overture, the Rogue State decision maker has 
three player strategies that it might use to respond to both the U.S. and insurgent 
resistance force existential threats: 1) make the requested concessions to the U.S., but 
conduct Counter-Insurgency operations against the resistance force; 2) resist the U.S. 
coercive act by making no concessions, and conduct COIN against the resistance force; 
and 3) resist the U.S. coercive act by making no concessions, but make placating 
concessions to the resistance force. 
Which strategy each player will choose is dependent upon the aforementioned 
decision theories and game assumptions. How each player perceives the outcome 
associated with each strategy based on the other player’s action will be decided by the 
decision frame of the players as we will now see in the coercion models themselves.       
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D. COVERT COERCION GAME MODELS 
There are four coercion models that will be examined. Each model will analyze 
the outcome payoffs for both the U.S. and the Rogue State utilizing either a gains or loss 
decision frame for each player. The object of analysis is to examine which combination 
of gains and loss decision frames for both players will result in an optimal condition for 
covert coercion to be a suitable coercive policy option with an optimal chance of gaining 
a successful outcome. 
1. Model 1: Rogue State in a Loss Frame / U.S. in a Loss Frame 
Model 1 examines a scenario where both the Rogue State and the U.S. are in a 
loss decision frame. The Model 1 scenario presupposes that the Rogue State actors find 
themselves in a reference point position of relative loss in accordance with their 
hypothetical value function. As was discussed in Chapter III, the loss frame puts the 
Rogue State in a posture that is typically more risk acceptant.   
Several factors can lead to the causation of this condition. First, the Rogue State is 
under immense international and regional pressure from threats of military force, 
sanctions, or foreign invasion and is feeling imperiled with not way out. The Rogue State 
may have even already been coerced to cede territory, lands, or resources to other 
antagonistic regional or international states.   
Second, the domestic legitimacy of the incumbent authority is waning to the point 
where the Rogue State feels as though its only recourse is to retain its position of 
authority through repressive and oppressive control measures, thereby seeding further 
malcontent amongst the population. Third, the Rogue State incumbent authorities have 
been accused rightly or wrongly of crimes against humanity from both their domestic 
constituents and the international or regional community, thus congealing the authorities’ 
view that the only way out is to survive by resisting both the resistance force and the 
international community. This is arguably the case with the embattled Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad resultant from the harsh crackdown his administration has imposed on 
the Syrian population as a result of insurgent uprising.   
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Fourth, the Rogue State is overly concerned with appearing “weak” in the eyes of 
the domestic and international audience, and feels as though resisting is the only way to 
maintain its prestige and legitimacy.142  These are just the principal few of the many 
causes that could contribute towards the Rogue State identifying itself in the domain of 
losses. 
These considerations contribute to the following ordinal preference payoffs for 
the Rogue State for each outcome where “six” is the most preferred outcome and “one” is 
the least preferred as shown in Table 1: 
Table 1.   Ordinal preference payoffs for the Rogues State in a loss frame. 
6 The Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN” if the U.S. 
chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy: the Rogue State cannot be perceived as 
weak. In the domain of losses, resistance is therefore the Rogue State’s only 
preferable option. The Rogue State prefers the U.S. choosing the “Overt 
Coercion” strategy to that of “Covert Coercion” because it reasons that the U.S. 
will be too constrained domestically and internationally to impart significant 
costs upon the Rogue State that it cannot withstand. The Rogue State also hopes 
to draw the U.S. into an action that will either tarnish U.S. prestige, or turn 
international and Rogue State domestic opinion against the U.S. for being 
“unjust,” thereby increasing sympathy and support for the Rogue State regime. 
5 The Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN” if the U.S. 
chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy: the Rogue State cannot be perceived as 
weak and is threatened to the point where it identifies with the domain of 
losses, resistance is therefore the Rogue State’s only preferable option. 
However, the Rogue State perceives the U.S. strategy of “Covert Coercion” as 
less desirable than “Overt Coercion” because it serves only to fuel the domestic 
insurgency and the Rogue State cannot appeal to the international community 
for support against an unjust U.S. action because of the plausible deniability of 
the covert action. 
(Continues on next page)
                                                
142 In his book Blunder, Zachary Shore cites this phenomenon as the cognitive trap of exposure 
anxiety. Exposure anxiety is the fear of being thought of as weak and that a failure to act in a fashion that is 
perceived as firm will result in the weakening of one’s position. See Zachary Shore, Blunder: Why Smart 
People Make Bad Decisions (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008), 13. Page references are to the Kindle edition. 
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4 The Rogue State chooses to “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN” if the U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy: the Rogue State prefers to 
make concessions to the U.S. before it makes concessions to the resistance 
force lest the resistance force become too legitimate and powerful. The Rogue 
State believes that a “quiet deal” with the U.S. will cost the Rogue State less 
domestic and international prestige and legitimacy than if the concessions were 
in response to an overt coercive act. Furthermore, assumedly making 
concessions to the U.S. will weaken the resistance force enough for the Rogue 
State COIN effort to dissolve the insurgency thus allowing the Rogue State to 
maintain power. Ergo, a loss on the international stage does not hurt the Rogue 
State as much as a loss against the insurgency possibly leading to regime 
change.   
3 The Rogue State chooses to “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN” if the U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy: if it must choose between 
making concessions to either the U.S. or the resistance force in a loss frame, the 
Rogue State believes that it can recover from making concessions to the U.S. 
but not to the resistance force. 
2 The Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Make Concessions to the 
Resistance Force” if the U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy: this is the 
least preferable strategy for the Rogue State and the second to worst preferable 
outcome. The Rogue State can ill afford to lose further domestic legitimacy, 
and from a loss frame feels that if concessions to the U.S. are not palatable, 
then making a temporary alliance with the resistance force to “flush out” the 
embedded clandestine U.S. operatives is the next best thing towards gaining 
bargaining leverage. At the very least an alliance with the resistance force will 
deny the U.S. a covert option. 
1 The Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Make Concessions to the Resistance Force” if the U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy: this is the 
least desirable outcome for the Rogue State in the loss frame. Perceptibly, not 
only does the Rogue State lose precious domestic legitimacy by significantly 
empowering the resistance force movement, but it is also besieged at the 
international level by the U.S.. 
Table 1 (continued from  previous page) 
 
Similar to the Rogue State, the U.S. policy makers also identify their reference 
point from a position of relative loss in congruence with their hypothetical value function 
for the Model 1 scenario. Like the Rogue State, the U.S. is also operating from a more 
risk accepting decision frame.   
The first of the principal contributing factors responsible for pressing the U.S. into 
the self-identified domain of losses is that the U.S. may have been recently attacked in a 
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fashion similar to Pearl Harbor at the onset of WWII or the 9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist 
attacks. Such an attack would likely shape the perception that the U.S.’s national security 
is under a significant threat thus generating overwhelming domestic support for policy 
makers to eliminate the perceived existential threat. Second, the livelihood of several 
American citizens and/or diplomats are in peril on the order of the Iran hostage crisis in 
1979 that compels an aggressive U.S. response commensurate with the amount of 
domestic support behind the action. Third, a WMD attack of the U.S. homeland is 
assessed as likely or imminent as was the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 
1962. Fourth, the U.S. feels threatened by a growing political or religious ideology that 
seeks to counter or destroy the American democratic ideology, as was the case during the 
height of the Cold War communist expansion that led to communism paranoia within the 
U.S. and its Western allies. Fifth, U.S. territory, air space, resources, alliances, or other 
security interest is threatened to the point that the domestic opinion demands an overt 
response to counter and assuage the threat. In all of the above cases it should be noted 
that the domestic opinion is moved to support the policy makers in pursuing coercive 
action against the Rogue State threat—even to the point of war which is the definitive 
manifestation of coercion. Such domestic support significantly reduces the political 
constraints placed upon policy makers that make overt coercion not only likely, but also 
necessary to quench the domestic appetite for justice and restore a sense of security for 
the U.S. population. 
These considerations contribute to the following ordinal preference payoffs for 
the U.S. for each outcome where “six” is the most preferred outcome and “one” is the 
least preferred as shown in Table 2: 
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Table 2.   Ordinal preference payoffs for the U.S. in a loss frame. 
6 The U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses to “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN”: the U.S. is not as 
constrained domestically in the loss frame and it feels compelled to act overtly 
to counter the Rogue State threat with a domestic and international justice of 
cause. Therefore, the U.S. will not want to subvert domestic and international 
support for coercive action by pursuing the secretive and deception filled 
method of covert coercion. 
5 The U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses 
to “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN:” while the U.S. does not 
prefer the less politically legitimate covert coercion recourse to that of overt 
coercion, the U.S. does prefer the Rogue State to make the necessary 
concessions to the U.S. juxtaposed to any of the other Rogue State strategies. 
4 The U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN:” if the Rogue State is to resist the U.S., the 
U.S. still prefers to coerce overtly given the greater likelihood of maintaining a 
justice of cause perception and claim to legitimacy of action with domestic 
and international support. The U.S. also prefers to see the uncooperative 
Rogue State plagued in dealing with an insurgency further bleeding away the 
Rogue State’s prestige and legitimacy. 
3 The U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses 
to “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN:” the U.S. would prefer to help the 
resistance force towards attaining its political goals and objectives than to have 
to continue to deal with an uncooperative Rogue State regime. 
2 The U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses 
to “Resist the U.S./Make Concessions to the Resistance Force:” this is the 
second to least preferable outcome for the U.S.. The Rogue State’s alliance 
with the resistance force negates the possibility of a regime change to a 
potentially more cooperative Rogue State governing authority for the U.S. to 
deal with. 
1 The U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses 
to “Resist the U.S./Make Concessions to the Resistance Force:” this is the 
least desirable outcome for the U.S. in the loss frame. If the Rogue State were 
to ally with the resistance force while the U.S. was funding and supporting the 
same organization, the situation could compromise clandestine operatives 
working with the resistance forces and severely damage the U.S.’s prestige 





Collectively, the Rogue State and U.S. ordinal preference payoffs will now allow 
Model 1 shown below in Figure 5 to be examined. 
 
Figure 5.  Model 1: Rogue State in a loss frame / U.S. in a loss frame. 
Both the U.S. and the Rogue State use the maximin decision criterion, which is 
consistent with each player’s objectives to maximize the outcome with respect to both 
players’ payoffs determined by their decision frames.143  As the game is played with the 
movement diagram, an equilibrium outcome is reached when the U.S. plays its “Overt 
Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State responds with its “Resist the U.S./Conduct Coin” 
strategy. Because the partial conflict game does not involve strategic moves with 
communication, both the U.S.’s “Overt Coercion” and the Rogue State’s “Resist the 
U.S./Conduct COIN” strategies can be identified as dominant strategies for each 
respective player.   
With both players in a loss frame, the outcome of the model produces no 
concessions while imposing costs on both players. An example of this type of coercion 
                                                
143 In partial conflict, one-time decision games it is assumed that both players will choose their 
maximin strategy since both player are trying to maximize their outcomes with respect to each players’ 
respective ordinal preference payoff scale commensurate with their decision frame. 
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model includes the Korean War stalemate that resulted between the South Koreans and 
the U.S. led NATO coalition against North Korea sponsored by communist China.      
2. Model 2: Rogue State in a Gains Frame / U.S. in a Loss Frame 
Model 2 examines the coercion conflict game when the Rogue State is in a gains 
frame and the U.S. is in a loss frame. Unlike Model 1, the Rogue State now approaches 
the coercion game from a reference point position of relative gains, which shifts its risk 
behavior towards a more averse posture.   
A principal influence that contributes towards this condition could be the 
acquisition of new territory. If the Rogue State were to annex new lands that belonged 
formerly to a third party state, the gains frame logic suggests that the Rogue State would 
not be willing to incur as much cost to retain the newly acquired territory juxtaposed to 
having the Rogue State’s original sovereign territories threatened. This idea is compatible 
with the notion that a nation will fight harder for its homeland than for a foreign land 
acquired in an imperialistic conquest.   
Second, the Rogue State could be in a gains frame resultant from newly gained 
regional political influence. A great example of this phenomenon is Iran’s growing 
political influence extending to Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq through proxy 
organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, Kurdish PKK, and Iraqi Da’wa and SCIRI—now 
ISCI—respectively. Though Iran has not annexed these neighboring countries outright, 
Iran’s resultant growing political influence in the region is largely undisputable. Some of 
this influence is reasonably new and could therefore be argued as a relative gain for Iran. 
Similarly, if the Rogue State were to gain “soft” political influence in neighboring 
countries and the U.S. wanted to target those relative gains through coercion, prospect 
theory’s principles suggest that the Rogue State may be more risk averse in protecting 
those gains relative to its own domestic sovereignty.   
Third, the Rogue State may have gained some other security advantage such as a 
forward deployed military instillation or ICBM site. This is similar to the situation when 
USSR First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev forward deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba in 
the summer and fall of 1962, an action that precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
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The ordinal preferences for the Rogue State operating in the gains frame will be 
different than the loss frame. Specifically, by virtue of operating from a position of 
relative gains, the Rogue State is now in a better position to give concessions to a 
coercive demand. The risk averse or avoidance behavior also highlights the unwillingness 
of the Rogue State to incur too much cost by resisting coercive action as is noted in the 
ordinal preference payoffs shown in Table 3: 
Table 3.   Ordinal preference payoffs for the Rogue State in a gains frame. 
6 The Rogue State chooses to “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN” if 
the U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy: the Rogue State’s optimal 
strategy and outcome for a gains frame decision that is risk averse. The gains 
frame perspective of costs imposed by the U.S.’s covert coercive efforts leads 
the Rogues State to discretely make required concessions to the U.S. in an 
effort to prevent further exogenous support to a pestilent insurgency. The 
Rogue State prefers the discrete form of covert coercion to that of overt 
coercion because concessions do not come at a price of looking as weak 
internationally or domestically. The Rogue State also prefers to make 
concessions to the U.S. over the resistance force because the insurgency 
problem threatens the domestic legitimacy of the Rogue State government 
thereby maintaining a reference point closer to the domain of losses than 
concessions to the U.S. might.     
5 The Rogue State chooses to “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN” if the U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy: the optimal strategy and second 
best outcome for the Rogue State. Though the Rogue State would prefer to 
make concessions in a less open fashion so as to not damage its international or 
domestic prestige by appearing weak, the Rogue State still prefers to make 
concessions to the U.S. over the resistance force based on ordinal placement 
along the value function that suggests concessions towards the resistance force 
would hurt more than concessions to the U.S. because concessions to the 
resistance force is closer to the domain of losses. 
(Continues on next page)
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4 The Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Make Concessions to the Resistance Force” if the U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy: though 
the Rogue State would prefer to make concessions further away from its 
domestic sphere and domain of losses, the Rogue State’s risk avoidance nature 
determined by the gains frame suggests that the Rogue State would prefer to 
abdicate some power to the resistance force than to incur additional costs and 
potentially lose power completely. Under these conditions the Rogue State 
would prefer to ally itself with the resistance force in an effort to stymie U.S. 
covert coercive efforts, and possibly compromise or capture U.S. clandestine 
operatives for the purposes of diminishing U.S. prestige internationally while 
gaining bargaining leverage. The U.S.’s overt coercion would not afford the 
Rogue State such an opportunity. 
3 The Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Make Concessions to the Resistance Force” if the U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy: though it 
would prefer to make concessions under one of the previous three conditions, 
the Rogue State would still prefer to make concessions to avoid greater 
incurrence of cost. Additionally, making concessions to the resistance force 
improves the Rogue State’s position to resist the U.S.’s overt coercion methods.   
2 The Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN” if the U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy: the least preferred strategy and the 
second to worst outcome for the Rogue State in the gains frame. Resisting both 
the U.S. and the resistance force will incur the greatest cost for the Rogue State. 
However, with the U.S. pursuant of covert coercion the Rogue State reasons 
that dealing with the insurgent threat sponsored by the U.S. is better than 
dealing with both the insurgency and overt coercive pressure from the U.S. 
which will challenge the Rogue State’s prestige internationally. 
1 The Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN” if the U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy: the least preferred strategy and outcome 
for the Rogue State in a gains frame. Additional costs are incurred at both the 
domestic and international levels and the Rogue State’s prestige could be 
severely degraded. 
Table 3 (continued from previous page) 
 
In contrast to the Rogue State, the U.S. is still in a loss frame for the Model 2 
scenario. The contributing causal factors discussed in Model 1 apply to the U.S. still in 
Model 2. The U.S. is still operating in the domain of losses where the decision behavior 
is risk accepting and domestic, and possibly international, opinion does not constrain U.S. 
policy makers. Therefore, the U.S.’s ordinal preference payoffs remain unchanged as 
shown in Table 2. With the payoffs for both players defined the Model 2 coercion game 
shown in Figure 6 can now be examined. 
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Figure 6.  Model 2: Rogue State in a gains frame / U.S. in a loss frame. 
Like Model 1, both the U.S. and the Rogue State apply the maximin decision 
criterion as the players try to maximize their outcomes for a one-time decision in a partial 
conflict game without communication. The Rogue State’s recalibrated payoffs for a gains 
decision frame coupled with the U.S.’s develop the movement diagram shown in Figure 
6. An equilibrium outcome results when the U.S. plays its “Overt Coercion” strategy and 
the Rogue State responds by playing its “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN” 
strategy. It may also be said that because this is a partial conflict game without strategic 
moves resulting from communication, the U.S. still has a dominant strategy of “Overt 
Coercion” while in the loss frame while the Rogue State’s dominant strategy now 
becomes “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN,” which is different from the 
Rogue State’s previous dominant strategy in the loss frame. 
The equilibrium outcome is the most desirable outcome for the U.S. in the loss 
frame when compared with Model 1. The coercive action is perceived as “just” and the 
necessary concessions are obtained from the Rogue State. A historical example of this 
game could be found in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Though President Kennedy did make 
some concessions of his own with regards to removing U.S. missile systems from 
Turkey, the overt coercive mechanism of the naval blockade coupled with the threat of 
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invading Cuba was an effective imposition of cost for Khrushchev and his advisors to 
consider from the USSR’s gains frame point of reference.  
3. Model 3: Rogue State in a Loss Frame / U.S. in a Gains Frame 
The Model 3 scenario flips the decision frames of Model 2 to place the Rogue 
State back into a loss frame and the U.S. into a gains frame. Like the coercion game in 
Model 1, the Rogue State’s reference point is in the domain of losses which produces a 
more risk accepting decision behavior. The causal factors contributing towards the Rogue 
State’s position in the domain of losses also mirror the factors discussed with Model 1. 
Consequently, the Rogue State’s ordinal preference payoffs utilized in Model 1, depicted 
in Table 1, are to be utilized for Model 3. 
Conversely, the U.S. now identifies its reference point along the value function in 
the domain of gains which brings the U.S.’s decision behavior into a more risk averse or 
avoidance mode. The first probable causal factor inducing the U.S. into a gains mode is 
war weariness. To explicate, the U.S. may have recently gained a brief period of peace at 
the expense of tremendous costs in blood and treasure from a previous conflict. The 
recent gain of peace makes the prospect of another armed conflict unsavory to the 
American public and/or leadership. This was the case following almost every major 
conflict the U.S. engaged in in the 20th, and now 21st, century. For example, the U.S. 
sought to keep the cost of coercion as low and opaque as possible to the American public 
in the early Cold War years of the post WWII era. Though not every coercive overture 
utilized covert action approaches—the Korean War is the principal exception—the period 
of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration during the 1953–1961 period would become 
known as the “golden age of covert action.”  Coincidentally, this was also a period of 
tremendous economic growth in the U.S..   
This introduces the second factor, periods of economic prosperity, expansion, and 
growth may induce the U.S. towards a gains frame along the value function. This was the 
case not only in the 1950s, but also more recently in the economic boom of the 1990s 
during which the U.S. relied increasingly upon the use of SOF in smaller Irregular 
Warfare conflicts like Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Restore Hope in 
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Somalia. As an inverse corollary to the U.S. in a loss frame, the U.S. in a gains frame 
operates in a much more constrained political space where significant risk aversion to 
costs exists. The domestic and international political constraints coupled with national 
security exigencies thereby create the conditions for covert coercion to be the preferred 
strategy of compellence. 
With the U.S.’s gains frame causal factors defined, the ordinal preference payoffs 
for the U.S. can now be described in Table 4: 
Table 4.   Ordinal preference payoffs for the U.S. in a gains frame. 
6 The U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses 
to “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN:” this is the optimal strategy 
and outcome for the U.S.. The gains frame and subsequent risk aversion attitude 
towards costs in blood and treasure that is determinant of a politically 
constrained environment makes “Covert Coercion” the preferred strategy. The 
desired response to any manifestation of coercion is the gaining of concessions 
from the Rogue State. 
5 The U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses to “Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN:” though “Overt Coercion” is 
not the optimal strategy for the U.S. in a gains frame, the outcome of gaining 
concessions from the Rogue State is preferred to pursuing “Covert Coercion” 
and failing. 
4 The U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses 
to “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN:” this is not the preferred outcome, but the 
gains frame renders “Covert Coercion” as the preferred strategy. The U.S. 
reasons that if it is to attempt a coercive policy and fail, the U.S. will loose less 
prestige and incur less cost than the alternative “Overt Coercion” strategy. 
3 The U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN:” this is neither the preferred outcome nor 
strategy, but this outcome is preferred to the Rogue State making concessions 
with the resistance force. The U.S. reasons that it is better to have the 
uncooperative Rogue State plagued in dealing with an insurgency, thereby 
further eroding the Rogue State’s prestige and legitimacy, than for the Rogue 
State to be at peace with the resistance force and collectively unified against the 
U.S.. 
(Continues on next page)
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2 The U.S. chooses its “Overt Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Make Concessions to the Resistance Force:” the U.S. prefers 
“Overt Coercion” to “Covert Coercion” because of the potential international 
and domestic damage that could result if the U.S. were to have its clandestine 
operatives compromised and exposed as a result of the Rogue State cutting a 
deal with the resistance force. The U.S. reasons that it would be better to try 
“Overt Coercion” and fail than to experience the loss of credibility, prestige, 
and justice of cause in an exposed covert action failure. 
1 The U.S. chooses its “Covert Coercion” strategy and the Rogue State chooses to “Resist the U.S./Make Concessions to the Resistance Force:” though “Covert 
Coercion” is largely the preferred strategy in a gains frame, the outcome 
resulting in the compromise of clandestine operatives is the least preferred. 
Table 4 (continued from previous page) 
 
With the ordinal preference payoffs defined for both players, Model 3 can now be 
examined in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Model 3: Rogue State in a loss frame / U.S. in a gains frame. 
Because the game depicted in Model 3 shown in Figure 7 is partial conflict with 
no strategic moves based on communication, the Rogue State has a dominant strategy of 
“Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN” similar to Model 1. Conversely, the U.S. does not have 
a dominant strategy in the game. Additionally, this model portrays the Rogue State 
choosing to apply a maximin criterion, which is also the Rogue State’s dominant strategy 
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similar to the previous two models. The U.S. recognizes that the Rogue State has a 
dominant strategy of “Resisting the U.S./Conduct COIN” and will seek to maximize its 
outcome by playing its “Covert Coercion” strategy. The movement diagram depicts the 
game’s equilibrium outcome when the U.S. chooses to use its “Covert Coercion” strategy 
and the Rogue State responds with its “Resist the U.S./Conduct COIN” strategy.   
Though the Model 3 coercion game does not result in the desired outcome of 
gaining concessions from the Rogue State, the gains frame leads the U.S. to select a 
strategy that does not incur as much cost in political prestige or American blood as an 
overt coercion enterprise might. An example of this model can be found in the U.S.’s 
sponsorship of the anti-Sandinistas—commonly referred to as Contras—that fought 
against the communist government in Nicaragua during the mid-1980s. President Ronald 
Reagan hoped to use the proxy resistance force as a tool to secure the release of 
American hostages and foster the spread of democracy in Latin America during the 
process. However, the enterprise would ultimately fail. 
4. Model 4: Rogue State in a Gains Frame / U.S. in a Gains Frame 
The last scenario is depicted in Model 4. In this model both the Rogue State and 
the U.S. are operating in a gains decision frame. Similar to Model 2, the Rogue State’s 
reference point is self-identified in the domain of gains along the Rogue State’s value 
function thus defining the Rogue State’s risk behavior as averse. The causal factors 
discussed in Model 2 also apply to Model 4 as do the ordinal preference payoffs depicted 
in Table 3. 
Similarly, the U.S. is also identifies its reference point in the domain of gains 
according to the U.S.’s value function. Like Model 3, the U.S. will still maintain a risk 
avoidance decision posture for the same reasons discussed in the previous model’s value 
analysis. The ordinal preference payoffs, shown in Table 4, for the U.S. also remain 
unchanged from Model 3. With the ordinal preference payoffs defined, the Model 4 
coercion game shown in Figure 8 can be examined. 
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Figure 8.  Model 4: Rogue State in a gains frame / U.S. in a gains frame. 
Because the game depicted by Model 4 shown in Figure 8 is partial conflict with 
no strategic moves based on communication, the Rogue State has a dominant strategy of 
“Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN,” which is similar to Model 2. 
Conversely, like Model 3 the U.S. does not have a dominant strategy in the game. 
Additionally, this model portrays the Rogue State choosing to apply a maximin criterion, 
which is also the Rogue State’s dominant strategy similar to the previous three models. 
The U.S. recognizes that the Rogue State has a dominant strategy of “Make Concessions 
to the U.S./Conduct COIN” and will seek to maximize its outcome by playing its “Covert 
Coercion” strategy. The movement diagram shows the game’s equilibrium outcome to be 
the U.S. playing its “Covert Coercion” strategy while the Rogue State responds with its 
“Make Concessions to the U.S./Conduct COIN” strategy.  
The outcome is optimal for the U.S. as covert coercion allows the policy maker to 
bypass domestic and/or international political constraints resultant from the gains frame 
environment. The result of Model 4 is significant in that it answers the research question 
that was originally posited in Chapter I. The decision frames required for covert coercion 
to be a viable U.S. coercive policy option exist in the domain of gains for both the U.S. 
and the Rogue State. An example of this model displayed in the context of a historical 
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UW case is the U.S.’s sponsorship of the Afghanistan Mujahidin in the coercion of the 
USSR to withdrawal its military forces from Afghanistan in the 1980s. Another case 
example can be found in the CIA sponsorship of the Tibetan resistance against the 
People’s Republic of China during the 1960s. President Richard Nixon was able to 
leverage this covert coercion effort to gain diplomatic concessions from Mao Tse-tung 
for rapprochement to further exploit soured Sino-Soviet relations in the U.S.’s effort to 
neutralize a key communist alliance in the Cold War.144  A third example can be found in 
Iran’s proxy use of Hezbollah in Lebanon to covertly coerce Israel into withdrawing its 
defense forces from Lebanon in the mid 1980s.   
E. A COVERT COERCION DECISION FRAME TYPOLOGY 
The above four coercion model outcomes can be depicted in a decision frame 
typology shown in Figure 9: 
 
Figure 9.  Covert coercion decision frame typology. 
The covert coercion decision frame typology provides an illustrative analysis or 
the coercion models’ outcomes. The rows of the matrix depict the binary decision 
                                                
144 Mikel Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors: The Story of the CIA-Backed Tibetan Freedom Fighters, the 
Chinese Communist Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet (New York: Penguin, 2004), 382–3. 
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frames—gain or loss—for the U.S. while the columns portray the Rogue State’s decision 
frames. The typology exhibits the thesis hypotheses discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter by showing the effects of the players’ decision frames on the outcome of 
coercion. Similarly, as was depicted in the coercion game Models 2 and 4, the decision 
frames were determinant of whether or not the Rogue State would be in a position to 
make concessions demanded by the U.S.. 
Model 4 was of significant interest as it suggested that the U.S. could successfully 
pursue a covert coercion policy if the action were to target the Rogue State’s assets 
located in the domain of gains in accordance with the Rogue State’s value function. 
Corroborating this notion, the examples mentioned in the Model 4 discussion intimated 
that the further away from the Rogue State’s domain of losses the targeted assets for 
coercion were, the more risk averse the Rogue State would be to incurring costs resultant 
from the U.S.’s compellent action. Restated, there may be a relationship between the 
successes of covert coercion’s targeting Rogue State political, territorial, informational, 
military, or economical peripheral gains vis-à-vis waging a limited UW campaign against 
the Rogue State authority’s existence and livelihood found in the domain of losses for the 
limited purpose of coercion. In the latter scenario the Rogue State has no room to make 
concessions and will predictably fight as though it has nothing to lose. In this situation, it 
may be more prudent to pursue the unreserved UW objective of instituting a regime 
change. 
Bringing this observation into the context of the contemporary interstate 
environment, an illustration concerning Iran’s widening influence can be offered. Some 
security policy analysts might favor a covert coercion campaign within Iran itself to 
generate behavior modification towards its meddling in regional affairs. However, the 
analysis conducted in this chapter suggests that this will only serve to embolden the 
resistance of the Iranian authorities towards the compellent action as it is targeting Iran’s 
domestic legitimacy—which can be found in the domain of losses on the Iranian value 
function. Conversely, if the U.S. were to wage a covert coercion campaign against Iran’s 
peripheral political gains themselves in Lebanon, Kurdistan, Egypt and Iraq the U.S. may 
have a better chance at gaining concessions from Iran in removing its military influences 
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within exogenous states because covert coercion is targeting Iranian assets in the domain 
of gains in accordance with Iran’s value function. 
This notion is reinforced by the views of war philosophers and strategists Sun Tzu 
and B.H. Liddell Hart. Both advocate an indirect approach that targets an opponent’s 
peripheral assets so as to not force them into a fight or die situation provoked by directly 
targeting the opponent’s assets located in the domain of losses. The idea of coercion is to 
invoke behavior modification by making resistance to concessions just costly enough 
without breaking the bank for the Rogue State, unless a more total political objective of 
regime change is desirable.     
F.  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter utilized models that have been constructed using 
prospect theory decision principles with the application of coercion policy towards a 
hypothetical Rogue State actor. The thesis hypotheses re-introduced at the beginning of 
the chapter proposed that decision frames have a governing effect on the successful 
outcome of covert coercion, and the ability of the Rogue State to make concessions—also 
linked to decision frames—is a principal determining factor of the covert coercion 
outcome. The assumptions and values of the coercion models were then introduced, 
which led to the analysis of four models by presenting the interaction of the U.S. and 
Rogue State in a exhaustive combination of gains and loss decision frames for each 
player. A covert coercion decision frame typology was then introduced to visually 
summarize the outcomes of the four coercion models and depict the logical value of 
decision frames on the effectual outcome of a covert coercion policy. The typology 
suggests that Rogue State concessions in response to a coercive action are more likely to 
occur when the Rogue State is in a gains frame. Furthermore, in answering the research 
question posited in Chapter I, I concluded that the gains frame for the U.S. would result 
in covert coercion becoming a viable coercive policy option whereas the loss frame 
impels the U.S. towards an overt coercion approach instead. Moreover, a gains frame for 
both the U.S. and the Rogue State is a decision frame—and consequently political 
condition—that will likely result in the successful application of covert coercion.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
“For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme 
of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, 
what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; 
next best is to disrupt his alliances; the next best is to attack his army; the 
worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no 
alternative.”—Sun Tzu145 
Statecraft exhibited through diplomacy is the highest order of conflict resolution 
that one could aspire to. Nevertheless, the interstate system will always be rife with actors 
that pursue interests spawned from ideals malign to U.S. national security interests, 
thereby requiring coercive force to compel an amenable resolution. Traditional coercive 
diplomacy for the democratic state can be a laborious process constrained politically at 
both the domestic and international levels. Covert action in its paramilitary and political 
action manifestation provides an indirect alternative to traditional overt coercive 
diplomacy. 
Analyzing covert coercion’s suitability through the lens of decision and prospect 
theory provided some insight as to when covert coercion may be considered to be a 
viable coercive policy option. Prospect theory’s foundational principles provided the 
underpinning premise that this thesis’s hypotheses were founded upon. The explored and 
theoretically tested hypotheses were: 
Hypothesis 1: The decision frames of the coercion actors largely determine the success 
or failure of covert coercion.  
 
Hypothesis 1.a: Domestic and international political constraints, probabilities of 
outcomes, and perceptions of prestige and legitimacy determine an actor’s 
decision frame.   
 
Hypothesis 1.b: A state actor’s decision frame is determinant in which 
coercion/response strategy the actor pursues. 
 
Hypothesis 1.c: The decision frames of the coercion actors can change through 
time. 
 
                                                
145 SunTzu, The Art of War, 77–8. 
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Hypothesis 2: A coerced state must have room to make concessions.  
  
Hypothesis 2.a: If covert coercion targets a rogue state’s gains (i.e., occupation of 
a third party state), it will be more likely to compel behavior modification, or gain 
concessions. 
 
Hypothesis 2.b: If covert coercion targets a rogue state’s losses (i.e., threatening 
overthrow/regime change), where the rogue state is less able to make concessions, 
compellence will likely not be achieved.  
 
Chapter II introduced covert coercion as a potential substitute for traditional overt 
coercive diplomacy. The Chapter’s discussion also identified potential deficiencies 
associated with the inappropriate or capricious employment of covert action; especially 
that of political action and paramilitary operations, which are closely associated with 
unconventional warfare. Nevertheless, there are also certain conditions under which 
covert coercive diplomacy may be viable, if not preferable. I posited two such primary 
conditions where covert coercion may be achievable: 1) a domestic or internationally 
constrained environment that does not allow for the coercing state to pursue “legitimate” 
offensive coercive action without losing domestic or international prestige; 2) covert 
coercion may be employed against an opponent state that has both room to make 
concessions to the coercive act and is in a decision frame that fosters concession as 
opposed to incurring the costs of the coercive act. While these conditions are in no way 
categorical or conclusive, they do accentuate the possibility that covert action can, and in 
some cases, should be used as a viable complement to coercive diplomacy.   
Chapter III introduced the core theories foundational to the models of conflict 
necessary to analyze the relevant decision frames for practitioners of interstate coercive 
policy. Decision theory was presented as a broad domain that seeks to analyze the logic 
of complex decisions. In the tradition of Bayesian decision theory, MEU has long been 
defended as the gold standard for explaining rational decision logic. However, MEU is 
limited in its ability to fully incorporate the cognitive dimension of human decision 
behavior in one-time decisions under risk where the probabilities of chance are not 
known or subjectively ascribed at best. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect 
theory offers a compelling alternative model for rational decision behavior under risk. 
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Unlike MEU, prospect theory posits that individuals do not think of outcomes in terms of 
net assets gained towards maximizing one’s utility; rather, people tend to think more in 
terms of gains and losses when it comes to risk. Furthermore, prospect theory suggests 
that individuals are prone to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, and will 
likely be risk averse in the domain of gains contrasted with a more risk accepting 
behavior in the losses domain. The result is that the decision maker will operate in either 
a gains frame or a loss frame in relation to their reference point when the decision maker 
is cognitively analyzing a choice between prospective alternatives. Consequently, the 
decision frame is critical to determining a decision maker’s risk behavior and valued 
preferences when he or she is considering one-time decisions under risk.   
Chapter IV utilized game theory models of conflict to analyze the relationship of 
Prospect Theory decision principles with the application of coercion policy towards a 
hypothetical Rogue State actor. The resulting analysis produced a covert coercion 
decision frame typology to visually summarize the outcomes of the four coercion models 
and depict the logical value of decision frames on the effectual outcome of a covert 
coercion policy. The typology suggests that Rogue State concessions in response to a 
coercive action are more likely to occur when the Rogue State is in a gains frame. 
Furthermore, in answering the research question posited in Chapter I, I concluded that the 
gains frame for the U.S. would result in covert coercion becoming a viable coercive 
policy option whereas the loss frame impels the U.S. towards an overt coercion approach 
instead. Moreover, a gains frame for both the U.S. and the Rogue State is a decision 
frame—and consequently political condition—that will likely result in the successful 
application of covert coercion. 
There is still much more research and study to be done on the topic of covert 
coercion. I made some simplifying assumptions in my analysis to hold other independent 
variables constant to focus on the interaction between two state actors. One such variable 
that deserves further study is the relationship between the U.S. and the proxy covert 
coercion force. Specifically, are there unique antecedent or operational conditions that 
will lead to a successful UW campaign in pursuant of compellence?  How should the 
relationship between the U.S. and the proxy force by defined in the context of covert 
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coercion?  Is it different than other UW campaigns that pursue either disruption or 
instituting regime change through the overthrow of a government or occupying power?  
These questions, and others, are valid ones and should be explored further.    
In the new era, the U.S. is endeavoring to establish a global “light” footprint in 
order to build networks and capacity with allied partners towards the political aim of 
conflict prevention. This strategy is increasingly preferred to what until now has been a 
coercive policy based on unilateral direct action in reaction to a threat. Covert coercion 
fits nicely into this new grand strategy paradigm as it focuses on indirect approaches that 
utilize indigenous host-nation networks to achieve compellent effects. However, this 
analysis has shown that there is no one “magic bullet” to successfully achieve 
concessions in response to a compellent action, if at all. Rather, it is a decision under risk 
influenced by the cognitive perceptions of the principal decision makers that have the 
heavy responsibility to discernably assess the mind of the antithetical state. Covert 
coercion is a viable option, but like all instruments of foreign policy it must be applied 
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